This brings us back to the Cryptonote adaptive blocksize limit combined with a tail emission found in Monero where:
1) The cost of mining a block is set by the block subsidy
Correct, meaning the amount of hashrate miners spend will be equal to the block subsidy[1] (where block subsidy will ultimately be Monero's perpetual tail reward which is
necessarily a fixed # of coins), because (as I pointed out in
our prior discussion) transaction fees will trend to costs, due to that the median block size M
N will trend upwards to match market demand and thus there is no pricing power on transaction fees.
[1] Note this means the tail reward security of Monero will be very weak and insufficient.
2) The total amount in fees per block has to rise to a number comparable to, but most of the time smaller, than the block subsidy.
You wrote that before in our prior discussion:
The reason the above two scenarios do not apply to a Cryptonote coin with a tail emission such a Monero becomes apparent when one considers the economics of the total block reward components of fees and base reward (new coin emission). If the total in fees per block significantly exceed the base reward then it becomes economically attractive for miners to burn coins to the penalty by mining larger blocks. The block size rises until the total fees per block fall below a level where it is uneconomic for the miners to pay the penalty by increasing the blocksize. This level is comparable to the base reward. It is at this point where the need for a tail emission becomes clear, since without the tail emission the total block reward (fee plus base reward) would go to zero.
And it still doesn't make any sense to me. The block size will trend upwards to match transaction demand, because the penalty is driven to 0 as the median block size increases as miners can justify burning some of the transaction fees to the penalty. That drives the median block size upwards, which drives the penalty to 0 again. The median block size doesn't have any incentive to decrease again, thus transaction fees then fall to costs.
Sorry as I told you before, Monero does not solve the Tragedy of the Commons in Satoshi's design. It does adaptively increase the block size while preventing spam surges.
I doubt John Conner's design has achieved any better, because as I explained at our prior discussion, there is no decentralized solution to that Tragedy of the Commons in the current proof-of-work designs. I have a solution, but it is a very radical change to the proof-of-work design that relies on unprofitable mining by payers.