Those concerns can be applied to millions of websites where sensitive information is exchanged, including bitcointalk.
Exactly. Glad you understood.
Its objectively far worse to leave naked servers hosted in usa-friendly countries, failing to completely anonymize a transaction, not offering refunds for wrong deposits and keeping logs for a week. Many services are doing that.
TIL something extremely bad (like letting a big company under USA jurisdiction control all your traffic between server and client) is ok because the competitors do something I (subjectively) think it's worst. Great logic.
A pretty negative thing about the service in your signature is explained
in this post.
This:
I just had a look and it doesn't appear to make any link between funds coming out of ChipMixer to funds going into ChipMixer so it seems to show that ChipMixer works.
And this:
That’s funny for you to say after this post:
Breaking Mixing ServicesQuoting it:
I found some trivial bugs (timing attacks, leakages, xss, ...) through which nearly all relevant centralized bitcoin mixing services could be broken. Based on outgoing mixing transactions (transactions sent by the mixer) I was able to identify the correct incoming transactions sent by customers (vice versa). [...]
[...] In my thesis, I attacked coinmixer.se (at the time of writing it was the biggest centralized mixing service), however - except chipmixer.com1 - every other centralized mixing service I checked could be broken in a similar fashion.
While the author doesn’t explicitly quotes
BestMixer’s bitcloak's name, it is clear that
BestMixer’s bitcloak's works exactly as the other traditional mixers (except that they charge huge fees for some “extra privacy” methods that no one can confirm if it works or if it even does anything at all).
ChipMixer isn't even on try here. So, weird for you to say this when we're talking about putting a government-controlled company in the middle of a totally privacy-oriented service.
Let's not derail this thread, ok?
