Topic: [ANN][DASH] Dash (dash.org) | First Self-Funding Self-Governing Crypto Currency - page 1643. (Read 9723926 times)

X11 Cloud Mining Hashrate Sold Out at Genesis Mining

"Genesis Mining just noted that the X11 hashing power they’ve had available is completely sold out due to unforeseen high demand and that they are working on expanding capacities."

http://cryptomining-blog.com/6166-x11-cloud-mining-hashrate-sold-out-at-genesis-mining/

Wow! Damn nice!!

P.S. Who is Pieter? Does he post here?

EDIT: He looks familiar...

"Intro to the Dash Ecosystem"
 Bitcoin Wednesday - next week - Amsterdam - The Netherlands

http://www.bitcoinwednesday.com/event/bitcoin-wednesday-29/
November 4 @ 15:00 - 19:30
GMT+2


 

Awesome, thanks for doing it. We need more community-made talks about Dash.

Give it a few weeks, Movember is apon us.

 He doesn't have a beard anymore!!  

  

World's First DAPI: Decentralized Application Programming Interface



http://cointelegraph.com/news/115510/worlds-first-dapi-decentralized-application-programming-interface

I saw an article not too long ago somewhere where a couple of programmer/scripters worked out how to automate the creation of thousands of free email addresses and then they created free cloud instances with those emails and mined with them. So it's not impossible.

Found it:  https://www.deepdotweb.com/2014/08/08/mining-cryptocurrency-free-cloud-botnet/

Good point. Yikes - it would be easy enough to levy a fee but some centralized entity would have to do the actual work. Mutter, mumble. I'll think of some way out (maybe).     

It's an interesting idea to be sure, but the weakness is that somebody has to pay the VPS provider, run the masternode, and maintain it.

Yes I know about Proof of Service, but in the (half-baked) model I describe, the sub-MN loose-change participants would be providing a portion of a MN and thus would be providing a portion of an MN service. Collectively, they would be providing new (and distributed) MNs, which would be the main point of the model.

I thought at first the model might be weak with respect to voting rights, but that could be resolved with scaling - a normal MN could get 1000 voting units (say) and a sub-MN participant could get an appropriate sub-MN number of voting units.

One reason this is on my mind is that my MN income coins seem so passive (like BTC or gold in a vault) until I can accumulate enough to buy another MN or use one of the existing bundling services (where I've always sensed that the granularity should be fairly large, say 300 coins and up, rather than a dozen or so coins from a month of MN income). My analogy is to the old banking model - letting the bank use my money if it pays me something in exchange (not of course the present banking model of ZIRP and NIRP) - the network might use people's sub-MN amounts to build new MNs with multiple anonymous partial (opt-in) owners. Hmmn - fatal flaw - if the real MNs were dominated by some govcorp entity, then the sub-MN amounts might be dominated by the same entity? I'm not sure if the distribution effect of "little guys" would be safe enough.

In any case, such models might or might not be feasible/worthwhile to code.

That sort of describes a Proof of Stake system. Dash uses a Proof of Service system, where masternodes are paid for the services they provide. It's not the 1000 Dash that generates the income, per se, it's the participation of the masternode on the network that earns the income. The 1000 Dash is just required to run a masternode in the first place.

In other words, sub-MN wallets cannot be paid by the network because they are not providing any service to the network (i.e. the running of a masternode).

Good point on being able to fork the project and relaunch--with lots of wealthy former holders--in the event an outside party ends up "owning" the chain.

Ouch - I have a quixotic impulse to tackle intractable problems. Looking to mitigate, not solve, might give some wiggle room.

I remember a discussion somewhere about pricing MNs more cheaply, but I've forgotten the pros and cons. I suppose one pro might be enabling wider MN distribution.

I know there are people who bundle sub-1000 amounts from various holders to make new MNs. Maybe that could be automated somehow - I'm just winging this - network gathers up loose change into bundles of 1000 and generates an automated transient MN that pays crumbs to participating accounts? Then again, perhaps Evolution will resolve the issue.

I'm out of my depth.   

I think that if we are talking about unlimited resources then the buying "attack" is a "vulnerability" that all coins share.  If you buy for example 80% of any cryptocurrency in existence whether Bitcoin based or Cryptonote based then you basically own it at that point. It ceases to play a role as a distributed currency and you make every single holder rich in the process, it does not seem like a real attack vector in my opinion, specially in crypto currency where all of the people you bought coins from and made rich in the process of "subverting" the coin can just go ahead and fork a new coin with a ton of your resources to work with.

Regardless of "limitless resources", all roads lead to buying up a majority of the coin supply.

Firstly, a majority of the supply is never on the market.

Secondly, anyone who was a holder would benefit far more if it *was* attacked in such a manner than if it *wasn't* 

This is very true and I replied to somebody the other day about this possibility. Frankly, I'm not sure there is anything that can presently be done (with any crypto or indeed any organization) that could stop a dedicated state actor from doing significant damage. The nearly unlimited resources of a major state actor would be probably be impossible to withstand. However, this transfers to really any organization that the government opposes. Subpoena power, arrest powers, civil forfeiture powers, etc. can all be used to coerce, damage, or destroy nearly any individual or organization.

Even the largest banks in the world can't stand up to the might of the U.S. government. The very large and powerful Swiss bank UBS recently buckled under the weight of threats from the U.S. government, although intervention from Hilary Clinton prevented it from turning into outright capitulation. (At issue was the fact that UBS' wealth management division was withholding information about account holders, despite subpoenas from the IRS. The U.S. was threatening to freeze all the bank's U.S. assets and begin arresting executives who traveled to the U.S. The bank found its position untenable and reached out to Hilary Clinton, then-Secretary of State, and brokered a deal.)

I don't think so, because mn owners are more or less anonymous, i.e. there is no way to automatically determine that mn A and mn B belong to the same owner. So how would you even identify how many mns a particular entity controls?

P.S.: One interesting scenario would be if there ever was a Silk Road-type bust involving Dash, i.e. some law enforcement agency confiscating a large number of coins from a Darknet operator. That would theoretically give them quite a bit of voting power, if they decide to go through the trouble of setting up masternodes

Nice post (all of it). The highlighted part above has got me thinking... I agree that getting a majority of MNs is now beyond reach of almost every individual bad actor. However, I think it is still trivially within the reach of many medium to large-sized govcorp entities, many of which are starting to acknowledge that crypto exists and are predictably trying to assert control over it in various ways.

If this is true, is there anything that can be done structurally to mitigate the possibility or the perception of the possibility of hegemonic MN control? I realize that growth over time can take care of the issue, but it seems to be a vulnerability now.

Someone linked this for me. I at least got a laugh out of it, thanks.

If anyone cares (unlikely), that *is* actually me.