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Topic: [ANN][DASH] Dash (dash.org) | First Self-Funding Self-Governing Crypto Currency - page 1643. (Read 9723706 times)

newbie
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legendary
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It's an interesting idea to be sure, but the weakness is that somebody has to pay the VPS provider, run the masternode, and maintain it.

Good point. Yikes - it would be easy enough to levy a fee but some centralized entity would have to do the actual work. Mutter, mumble. I'll think of some way out (maybe).      Wink





I saw an article not too long ago somewhere where a couple of programmer/scripters worked out how to automate the creation of thousands of free email addresses and then they created free cloud instances with those emails and mined with them. So it's not impossible.

Found it:  https://www.deepdotweb.com/2014/08/08/mining-cryptocurrency-free-cloud-botnet/

legendary
Activity: 1450
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Cryptanalyst castrated by his government, 1952

It's an interesting idea to be sure, but the weakness is that somebody has to pay the VPS provider, run the masternode, and maintain it.

Good point. Yikes - it would be easy enough to levy a fee but some centralized entity would have to do the actual work. Mutter, mumble. I'll think of some way out (maybe).      Wink



legendary
Activity: 1120
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I know there are people who bundle sub-1000 amounts from various holders to make new MNs. Maybe that could be automated somehow - I'm just winging this - network gathers up loose change into bundles of 1000 and generates an automated transient MN that pays crumbs to participating accounts? Then again, perhaps Evolution will resolve the issue.

I'm out of my depth.    Smiley



That sort of describes a Proof of Stake system. Dash uses a Proof of Service system, where masternodes are paid for the services they provide. It's not the 1000 Dash that generates the income, per se, it's the participation of the masternode on the network that earns the income. The 1000 Dash is just required to run a masternode in the first place.

In other words, sub-MN wallets cannot be paid by the network because they are not providing any service to the network (i.e. the running of a masternode).

Yes I know about Proof of Service, but in the (half-baked) model I describe, the sub-MN loose-change participants would be providing a portion of a MN and thus would be providing a portion of an MN service. Collectively, they would be providing new (and distributed) MNs, which would be the main point of the model.

I thought at first the model might be weak with respect to voting rights, but that could be resolved with scaling - a normal MN could get 1000 voting units (say) and a sub-MN participant could get an appropriate sub-MN number of voting units.

One reason this is on my mind is that my MN income coins seem so passive (like BTC or gold in a vault) until I can accumulate enough to buy another MN or use one of the existing bundling services (where I've always sensed that the granularity should be fairly large, say 300 coins and up, rather than a dozen or so coins from a month of MN income). My analogy is to the old banking model - letting the bank use my money if it pays me something in exchange (not of course the present banking model of ZIRP and NIRP) - the network might use people's sub-MN amounts to build new MNs with multiple anonymous partial (opt-in) owners. Hmmn - fatal flaw - if the real MNs were dominated by some govcorp entity, then the sub-MN amounts might be dominated by the same entity? I'm not sure if the distribution effect of "little guys" would be safe enough.

In any case, such models might or might not be feasible/worthwhile to code.




It's an interesting idea to be sure, but the weakness is that somebody has to pay the VPS provider, run the masternode, and maintain it.
legendary
Activity: 1450
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Cryptanalyst castrated by his government, 1952


I know there are people who bundle sub-1000 amounts from various holders to make new MNs. Maybe that could be automated somehow - I'm just winging this - network gathers up loose change into bundles of 1000 and generates an automated transient MN that pays crumbs to participating accounts? Then again, perhaps Evolution will resolve the issue.

I'm out of my depth.    Smiley



That sort of describes a Proof of Stake system. Dash uses a Proof of Service system, where masternodes are paid for the services they provide. It's not the 1000 Dash that generates the income, per se, it's the participation of the masternode on the network that earns the income. The 1000 Dash is just required to run a masternode in the first place.

In other words, sub-MN wallets cannot be paid by the network because they are not providing any service to the network (i.e. the running of a masternode).

Yes I know about Proof of Service, but in the (half-baked) model I describe, the sub-MN loose-change participants would be providing a portion of a MN and thus would be providing a portion of an MN service. Collectively, they would be providing new (and distributed) MNs, which would be the main point of the model.

I thought at first the model might be weak with respect to voting rights, but that could be resolved with scaling - a normal MN could get 1000 voting units (say) and a sub-MN participant could get an appropriate sub-MN number of voting units.

One reason this is on my mind is that my MN income coins seem so passive (like BTC or gold in a vault) until I can accumulate enough to buy another MN or use one of the existing bundling services (where I've always sensed that the granularity should be fairly large, say 300 coins and up, rather than a dozen or so coins from a month of MN income). My analogy is to the old banking model - letting the bank use my money if it pays me something in exchange (not of course the present banking model of ZIRP and NIRP) - the network might use people's sub-MN amounts to build new MNs with multiple anonymous partial (opt-in) owners. Hmmn - fatal flaw - if the real MNs were dominated by some govcorp entity, then the sub-MN amounts might be dominated by the same entity? I'm not sure if the distribution effect of "little guys" would be safe enough.

In any case, such models might or might not be feasible/worthwhile to code.


legendary
Activity: 1120
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I know there are people who bundle sub-1000 amounts from various holders to make new MNs. Maybe that could be automated somehow - I'm just winging this - network gathers up loose change into bundles of 1000 and generates an automated transient MN that pays crumbs to participating accounts? Then again, perhaps Evolution will resolve the issue.

I'm out of my depth.    Smiley



That sort of describes a Proof of Stake system. Dash uses a Proof of Service system, where masternodes are paid for the services they provide. It's not the 1000 Dash that generates the income, per se, it's the participation of the masternode on the network that earns the income. The 1000 Dash is just required to run a masternode in the first place.

In other words, sub-MN wallets cannot be paid by the network because they are not providing any service to the network (i.e. the running of a masternode).
legendary
Activity: 1120
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I think that if we are talking about unlimited resources then the buying "attack" is a "vulnerability" that all coins share.  If you buy for example 80% of any cryptocurrency in existence whether Bitcoin based or Cryptonote based then you basically own it at that point. It ceases to play a role as a distributed currency and you make every single holder rich in the process, it does not seem like a real attack vector in my opinion, specially in crypto currency where all of the people you bought coins from and made rich in the process of "subverting" the coin can just go ahead and fork a new coin with a ton of your resources to work with.

Good point on being able to fork the project and relaunch--with lots of wealthy former holders--in the event an outside party ends up "owning" the chain.
legendary
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Cryptanalyst castrated by his government, 1952
Ouch - I have a quixotic impulse to tackle intractable problems. Looking to mitigate, not solve, might give some wiggle room.

I remember a discussion somewhere about pricing MNs more cheaply, but I've forgotten the pros and cons. I suppose one pro might be enabling wider MN distribution.

I know there are people who bundle sub-1000 amounts from various holders to make new MNs. Maybe that could be automated somehow - I'm just winging this - network gathers up loose change into bundles of 1000 and generates an automated transient MN that pays crumbs to participating accounts? Then again, perhaps Evolution will resolve the issue.

I'm out of my depth.    Smiley

legendary
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I think that if we are talking about unlimited resources then the buying "attack" is a "vulnerability" that all coins share.  If you buy for example 80% of any cryptocurrency in existence whether Bitcoin based or Cryptonote based then you basically own it at that point. It ceases to play a role as a distributed currency and you make every single holder rich in the process, it does not seem like a real attack vector in my opinion, specially in crypto currency where all of the people you bought coins from and made rich in the process of "subverting" the coin can just go ahead and fork a new coin with a ton of your resources to work with.
legendary
Activity: 3066
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Frankly, I'm not sure there is anything that can presently be done (with any crypto or indeed any organization) that could stop a dedicated state actor from doing significant damage.

Regardless of "limitless resources", all roads lead to buying up a majority of the coin supply.

Firstly, a majority of the supply is never on the market.

Secondly, anyone who was a holder would benefit far more if it *was* attacked in such a manner than if it *wasn't*  Wink
legendary
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2) Criticism: Dash's masternodes are centralized.
*Corrective Action: The number of masternodes has increased from 600 to 3300; even a wealthy man like Otoh can't afford anything close to a majority of them.


Nice post (all of it). The highlighted part above has got me thinking... I agree that getting a majority of MNs is now beyond reach of almost every individual bad actor. However, I think it is still trivially within the reach of many medium to large-sized govcorp entities, many of which are starting to acknowledge that crypto exists and are predictably trying to assert control over it in various ways.

If this is true, is there anything that can be done structurally to mitigate the possibility or the perception of the possibility of hegemonic MN control? I realize that growth over time can take care of the issue, but it seems to be a vulnerability now.





This is very true and I replied to somebody the other day about this possibility. Frankly, I'm not sure there is anything that can presently be done (with any crypto or indeed any organization) that could stop a dedicated state actor from doing significant damage. The nearly unlimited resources of a major state actor would be probably be impossible to withstand. However, this transfers to really any organization that the government opposes. Subpoena power, arrest powers, civil forfeiture powers, etc. can all be used to coerce, damage, or destroy nearly any individual or organization.

Even the largest banks in the world can't stand up to the might of the U.S. government. The very large and powerful Swiss bank UBS recently buckled under the weight of threats from the U.S. government, although intervention from Hilary Clinton prevented it from turning into outright capitulation. (At issue was the fact that UBS' wealth management division was withholding information about account holders, despite subpoenas from the IRS. The U.S. was threatening to freeze all the bank's U.S. assets and begin arresting executives who traveled to the U.S. The bank found its position untenable and reached out to Hilary Clinton, then-Secretary of State, and brokered a deal.)
full member
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If this is true, is there anything that can be done structurally to mitigate the possibility or the perception of the possibility of hegemonic MN control? I realize that growth over time can take care of the issue, but it seems to be a vulnerability now.

I don't think so, because mn owners are more or less anonymous, i.e. there is no way to automatically determine that mn A and mn B belong to the same owner. So how would you even identify how many mns a particular entity controls?

P.S.: One interesting scenario would be if there ever was a Silk Road-type bust involving Dash, i.e. some law enforcement agency confiscating a large number of coins from a Darknet operator. That would theoretically give them quite a bit of voting power, if they decide to go through the trouble of setting up masternodes
legendary
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Cryptanalyst castrated by his government, 1952

2) Criticism: Dash's masternodes are centralized.
*Corrective Action: The number of masternodes has increased from 600 to 3300; even a wealthy man like Otoh can't afford anything close to a majority of them.


Nice post (all of it). The highlighted part above has got me thinking... I agree that getting a majority of MNs is now beyond reach of almost every individual bad actor. However, I think it is still trivially within the reach of many medium to large-sized govcorp entities, many of which are starting to acknowledge that crypto exists and are predictably trying to assert control over it in various ways.

If this is true, is there anything that can be done structurally to mitigate the possibility or the perception of the possibility of hegemonic MN control? I realize that growth over time can take care of the issue, but it seems to be a vulnerability now.



legendary
Activity: 1105
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Updates from the 'core' - Pump & Dump baby

03-30 [16:22:20] m8, i make pump tonight
03-30 [16:22:35] sweet! what time?
03-30 [16:22:36] are you with me
03-30 [16:22:41] 1h
03-30 [16:22:44] yeah let's do this!
03-30 [16:22:55] but we need btc
03-30 [16:23:01] i'm short atm
03-30 [16:23:09] i have xmr ,dash
03-30 [16:23:12] where do we get it?
03-30 [16:23:18] bittrex
03-30 [16:23:31] i setup bot
03-30 [16:23:36] and sell orders
03-30 [16:24:03] then what?
03-30 [16:24:09] do you have any btc for invest
03-30 [16:24:20] i mean , 25-30% profit
03-30 [16:24:27] we can share 50-50
03-30 [16:24:32] that sounds nice

  Shocked

Someone linked this for me. I at least got a laugh out of it, thanks.

If anyone cares (unlikely), that *is* actually me.
legendary
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We wouldn't if you didn't sometimes come across like such a Doos. Ek speel maar net.

lol, net 'n grappie, ne?

That said what would be the benefit of Evan putting malicious code into his project? Or anyone else from the dev team? Also as they can be rolled back by other members of the team any such theoretical attack from within could hopefully be negated?

Speaking purely hypothetically? The benefit would be when he's cashing out and he needs one-last-pump.

BTW: the effects of the backdoor can be observed in both cases when it is used, and not any earlier. So there is really no difference in that regard. The forking is of course possible, but that is easily observable, too, or am I missing something?

Well, imagine he obfuscates the code such that it only activates on a successful deactivation of an existing spork. Then it lies dormant until he reaches out and touches every node with His Noodly Appendage.

Wrong.

The spork is merely a secondary lever, not a magical "activate terrible code"-button. A malicious Monero developer for example could implement "underhanded code" into your official GUI-wallet release (you know, in 2045 or so when it's finished) with the simple instruction of having it activate when certain conditions are met, like a date, a block height, a difficulty level, even a certain transaction amount or a combination of any of these conditions. Heck, for all I care he could program his own spork as underhanded code into your release and create the same exact scenario you just tried to reduce onto DASH.

As you can see, your central argument has been easily refuted, making Dash just as vulnerable to that method as any other crypto. Not more, as you tried to construct. Nice try though.

The majority of those conditions (dates, block heights, difficulty levels, transaction amounts) would be easily visible even in heavily obfuscated code. Furthermore, activating at any of those junctures may be sub-optimal for our hypothetical malicious dev's needs. Being able to trigger at point-in-time is incredibly, incredibly powerful (in the negative sense).

Anyhow, this has been an interesting conversation, and I've appreciated the more mature responses from toknormal et al., but I think it's best to shake virtual hands and move on. Cheers:)

I'd like to thank you for your intelligent discussion and lack of trolliness. Those of us who believe in the future of Dash would be wise to remember that many of our most important features have come from Evan reading well-written critiques and making the necessary changes.

I'd like to ask a couple of questions of you:

a) Your point on obfuscated code is well-taken. I do understand the power of a "trigger" like the spork command and how the ability to perfectly time a hypothetical attack could be extremely useful. However, what prevents any cryptocurrency developer from putting secret/obfuscated spork-like code in their software? Couldn't Monero devs theoretically put a trigger command in their code and then hide it really well? Then when a dev sends a certain message the the network, the code would activate?

b) I know there have been crypto devs that have been caught with "secret" superblocks built into their currency. What is to prevent Monero from doing such a thing, only more cleverly? I realize that it would be harder to hide, but could it not be done?

c) I would like to point out that Dash underwent a security audit last year, and while much has changed since then, I feel certain that Kristov would have looked at the spork code. Though he is human and could have missed something, shouldn't that give a little extra reassurance versus a currency that has never been security-audited by a third party?

d) All software is a risk--many of us have been following the story of how Symantec managed to lose control of thousands of security certificates to employees who may have either been overzealous testers, or who may have been outright rogues. When we run any software, don't we accept those risks? Isn't an open source project like Dash significantly less risky than a closed source project like Windows?

e) Once the rapid development phase winds down, Evan will remove the spork and that risk will go away. If for some reason he was to refuse to remove the spork after rapid development, the project could be forked away from his control.

Frankly, I feel like a psychic. The instamine issue is just too unimportant for anyone to give a shit about. I had a feeling that the next "point of criticism" was going to be the spork code. Let's look at the history of criticism against Dash (I won't say trolling, because your posts very distinctly rise above that level):

1) Criticism: Darksend is based on CoinJoin, which has been shown to be weak.
*Corrective Action: Darksend has been improved drastically over the last year, with issues such as "dead change" resolved to everybody's satisfaction. Darksend has been security audited by Kristov Atlas and passed.

2) Criticism: Dash's masternodes are centralized.
*Corrective Action: The number of masternodes has increased from 600 to 3300; even a wealthy man like Otoh can't afford anything close to a majority of them.

3) Criticism: Evan runs a reference node to equalize masternode payment across the network. This is centralization.
*Corrective Action: The reference node was removed in v12. This really sent the trolls into a tailspin.

4) Criticism: Dash is instamined.
*Corrective Action: Evan has been very open and honest about those first few days, and the situation has been thoroughly explained. Honestly, most people don't really give a shit. All corporations endow their creators with equity, so if Evan got a few extra coins in the beginning, so much the better. The more Dash he holds, the greater his incentive to make his Dash move valuable by furthering development.

5) Criticism: The spork creates centralization risk.
*Corrective Action: A clear explanation of the what the spork does and does not do; an intelligent discussion about the risks inherent in any software, and how open-sourcing and security-auditing helps mitigate those risks.

The great thing is that every time critics bring up a problem, it gets fixed. Our critics in many ways are our greatest strength.

My wife really hates a particular store here in town. I kind of do too, although not quite as vehemently as she does. Let's say that she sees that store is doing something wrong, and so she complains about it. That's the worst possible thing she can do, if she wants this store to "suffer" in the long run. Why? Because by pointing out an organization's weaknesses, you give it a chance to improve itself.

For any true trolls out there who really want to see Dash fail, you should know that your constant discussion of Dash's weaknesses ultimately only strengthens the project.
sr. member
Activity: 283
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Best IoT Platform Based on Blockchain
The great thing about DASH is that it's the topic on everyone's minds. 

All right
I´ll let you know what dnaleor thinks about it (will just copy him this conversation).
kk
Btw, if I may ask, how are the performance issues proceeding? (This is regarding your post on reddit)
it's going
that's NoodleDoodle's domain right now
and he's made excellent progress
hard to tell when he'll be done
Nice to hear, let him take his time :-P
I rather have something right than a network split a few days after the release of the tagged version :p
agreed
this isn't Dash with "sporks"
I still don´t get the spork thing :p
Do you perhaps know what it exactly is?
It atleast isn´t decentralized
basically he wraps new code into a little block
and then he can use Bitcoin's alerting system to enable / disable it
So if he turns malicious one day they are basically fucked?
yes
Or under a gag order or whatever
That´s kinda scary
he can leave some dormant code in there and then remotely enable it
and they're too retarded to even notice
and they're too retarded to even notice <= Yeah reading their thread alone makes my brain cringe
lol
They behave as a cult though
yip
I find it odd that they call him by his first name Cheesy
It´s not like we call you Ric all day on the forum
lol
imagine that
And otoh is still buying
I think my finance professor would get a sudden heart attack if he sees his portfolio
lol

The two most talked about Monero topics are GUI wallet and Dash.

Well hopefully this is the end of dEBRUYNE crap talk here *It's not me look I am nice only here to promote XMR shit* they probably planned everything with dnlear instead of actually working to create not anything new but just ANYTHING that is supposed to work with XMR after copying Bytecoin. + low grade developer criticizing Evan for he's awesome work that he wouldn't even come up with a simple GUI wallet nor he will come up with amazing idea like MN's + instant transactions even if he stayed in a class room studying for the next 10 years.
hero member
Activity: 617
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Crypto Card - https://platinum.crypto.com/r/28cz7d

So would it not be better to get away from that exchange? Cause by trading there we indirectly promote market manipulation?

It's a free market and ultimately fundamentals prevail.

Shorters tend to massacre assets with weak fundamentals but are more wary of stocks that have some background stability. Dash is already pretty well compacted due to a year's worth of incessant trolling and a period of quiet while the next development phase goes on.

It would be a brave shorter who tried to push it any further because you just have to look at the trading of the last few weeks to see what the problem would be - finding the liquidity to close out your shorts. There's almost nobody selling at these prices, let alone at another 10-30% discount.


Good point. At first I disliked the interface, but now got used to poloniex. Its kinda nice.
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