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Topic: Bitcoin XT - Officially #REKT (also goes for BIP101 fraud) - page 168. (Read 379003 times)

legendary
Activity: 3948
Merit: 3191
Leave no FUD unchallenged


Look Peter it's quite simple, either you accept that for the block size to increase consensus needs to be reach by all actors of the Bitcoin market or you continue pretending that the demand of consumers & merchants for lower cost transactions will move the needle which it won't in that case if they "fork" it will be in their own cheap little altcoin.


You love going around in circles, don't you?  

As knight22 already explained a few times, there's no such thing as perfect consensus.

Do you refuse to accept the possibility that an economic majority will have their way and increase the blocksize even though you don't agree?

 Undecided

The economic majority is the one most interested in keeping the block size small.

The XT #REKT event should have made that clear.

Consumers and merchants are never going to be the economic majority in Bitcoin

Not by themselves, perhaps, but throw a few others into the mix and the picture starts to look a little different.


Larger (than 1MB) blocks will naturally provide benefit to:

    Anyone who wants to use Bitcoin as a payments network
    VC investors
    Miners
    Merchants
    Payment processors
    Average users in general

Smaller blocks will naturally provide benefit to:

    Those who want to use Bitcoin as an asset class (i.e. not the average user)
    Those wanting to run full nodes cheaply (i.e. not the average user)
    Those who don't care if the average user is priced off the main chain (i.e. definitely not the average user)


Pretty sure that first group will agree on a proposal before too long.  We'll see if you're right about them not being an economic majority.  
sr. member
Activity: 504
Merit: 250
Earn with impressio.io
I am quite serious.  If the longest chain contains a block greater than 1 MB by this time next year I win, otherwise you win.  The longest chain is defined as the chain built on top of the Satoshi genesis block with the greatest cumulative difficulty.  If Bitcoin forks, then I only win if the "large block" fork has a greater cumulative difficulty than the "small block" fork.

As for escrow, I am open to suggestions.  Danny Hamilton and Jonald Fyookball come to mind.  We would each deposit 1 BTC into a 2-of-3 multisig address and the escrow would hold the third key.  

Suppose there is more than one chain building on top of the Satoshi genesis block and that the one with the greatest cumulative difficulty does contain a block greater than 1 MB. It's clear you (Peter R) "win." But does that mean you get the 2BTC on every still-active chain? Or only on the one with the greatest cumulative difficulty? That outcome isn't clearly specified by what you're writing.

1BTC is too rich for me, but I could put up 0.5 BTC with the following agreement: This time next year (let's say October 1, 2016) Peter R gets the 1 BTC on every active chain that includes the multisig bet output which contains a block greater than 1 MB. I get the 1 BTC on every other active chain that contains the multisig bet output. "Active chain" means that there were at least 20 consecutive blocks mined on the chain on October 1, 2016.
Unfortunately, there's nothing that can prevent BTC from being spent on any chain, unless the hard-fork makes transactions incompatible between chains.

I've read about the process for chain-specific spending in enough of these threads to think it's not so difficult.

1. Obtain coins that are chain-specific. These could either be descendants of coins mined on one chain or descendents of coins that were purposefully separated on the chains. (Purposeful separation might require several tries, but it's clear how to do it and that it will eventually succeed.)

2. Use chain-specific coins as one of the inputs to the tx being signed.

If I remember correctly, Peter R is one of the people arguing: There won't be more than one active chain. Certainly I've seen Gavin make such an argument. However, it's clearly possible, and any "bet" should take this possibility into account.
Yep, mixing a spend with chain-specific inputs can work. It's a workaround, though, as one would have to provide these inputs.

Would this require a fork to enhance scripts, or are we saying today's scripting do this? 
legendary
Activity: 1386
Merit: 1009
I am quite serious.  If the longest chain contains a block greater than 1 MB by this time next year I win, otherwise you win.  The longest chain is defined as the chain built on top of the Satoshi genesis block with the greatest cumulative difficulty.  If Bitcoin forks, then I only win if the "large block" fork has a greater cumulative difficulty than the "small block" fork.

As for escrow, I am open to suggestions.  Danny Hamilton and Jonald Fyookball come to mind.  We would each deposit 1 BTC into a 2-of-3 multisig address and the escrow would hold the third key.  

Suppose there is more than one chain building on top of the Satoshi genesis block and that the one with the greatest cumulative difficulty does contain a block greater than 1 MB. It's clear you (Peter R) "win." But does that mean you get the 2BTC on every still-active chain? Or only on the one with the greatest cumulative difficulty? That outcome isn't clearly specified by what you're writing.

1BTC is too rich for me, but I could put up 0.5 BTC with the following agreement: This time next year (let's say October 1, 2016) Peter R gets the 1 BTC on every active chain that includes the multisig bet output which contains a block greater than 1 MB. I get the 1 BTC on every other active chain that contains the multisig bet output. "Active chain" means that there were at least 20 consecutive blocks mined on the chain on October 1, 2016.
Unfortunately, there's nothing that can prevent BTC from being spent on any chain, unless the hard-fork makes transactions incompatible between chains.

I've read about the process for chain-specific spending in enough of these threads to think it's not so difficult.

1. Obtain coins that are chain-specific. These could either be descendants of coins mined on one chain or descendents of coins that were purposefully separated on the chains. (Purposeful separation might require several tries, but it's clear how to do it and that it will eventually succeed.)

2. Use chain-specific coins as one of the inputs to the tx being signed.

If I remember correctly, Peter R is one of the people arguing: There won't be more than one active chain. Certainly I've seen Gavin make such an argument. However, it's clearly possible, and any "bet" should take this possibility into account.
Yep, mixing a spend with chain-specific inputs can work. It's a workaround, though, as one would have to provide these inputs.
full member
Activity: 132
Merit: 100
willmathforcrypto.com
I am quite serious.  If the longest chain contains a block greater than 1 MB by this time next year I win, otherwise you win.  The longest chain is defined as the chain built on top of the Satoshi genesis block with the greatest cumulative difficulty.  If Bitcoin forks, then I only win if the "large block" fork has a greater cumulative difficulty than the "small block" fork.

As for escrow, I am open to suggestions.  Danny Hamilton and Jonald Fyookball come to mind.  We would each deposit 1 BTC into a 2-of-3 multisig address and the escrow would hold the third key.  

Suppose there is more than one chain building on top of the Satoshi genesis block and that the one with the greatest cumulative difficulty does contain a block greater than 1 MB. It's clear you (Peter R) "win." But does that mean you get the 2BTC on every still-active chain? Or only on the one with the greatest cumulative difficulty? That outcome isn't clearly specified by what you're writing.

1BTC is too rich for me, but I could put up 0.5 BTC with the following agreement: This time next year (let's say October 1, 2016) Peter R gets the 1 BTC on every active chain that includes the multisig bet output which contains a block greater than 1 MB. I get the 1 BTC on every other active chain that contains the multisig bet output. "Active chain" means that there were at least 20 consecutive blocks mined on the chain on October 1, 2016.
Unfortunately, there's nothing that can prevent BTC from being spent on any chain, unless the hard-fork makes transactions incompatible between chains.

I've read about the process for chain-specific spending in enough of these threads to think it's not so difficult.

1. Obtain coins that are chain-specific. These could either be descendants of coins mined on one chain or descendents of coins that were purposefully separated on the chains. (Purposeful separation might require several tries, but it's clear how to do it and that it will eventually succeed.)

2. Use chain-specific coins as one of the inputs to the tx being signed.

If I remember correctly, Peter R is one of the people arguing: There won't be more than one active chain. Certainly I've seen Gavin make such an argument. However, it's clearly possible, and any "bet" should take this possibility into account.
donator
Activity: 980
Merit: 1000
Are the zero percenters still crying?

Let's remember the only measure that is not vulnerable to sockpuppetry AKA Sybil attacks:


Doubles as the encephalogram of most XTards.
legendary
Activity: 1302
Merit: 1008
Core dev leaves me neg feedback #abuse #political
Quote
Do you refuse to accept the possibility that an economic majority will have their way and increase the blocksize even though you don't agree?

The economic majority is the one most interested in keeping the block size small.
 

ill take that as a "yes".
hero member
Activity: 644
Merit: 504
Bitcoin replaces central, not commercial, banks


Look Peter it's quite simple, either you accept that for the block size to increase consensus needs to be reach by all actors of the Bitcoin market or you continue pretending that the demand of consumers & merchants for lower cost transactions will move the needle which it won't in that case if they "fork" it will be in their own cheap little altcoin.


You love going around in circles, don't you?  

As knight22 already explained a few times, there's no such thing as perfect consensus.

Do you refuse to accept the possibility that an economic majority will have their way and increase the blocksize even though you don't agree?

 Undecided

The economic majority is the one most interested in keeping the block size small.

The XT #REKT event should have made that clear.

Consumers and merchants are never going to be the economic majority in Bitcoin
legendary
Activity: 1652
Merit: 1483


Look Peter it's quite simple, either you accept that for the block size to increase consensus needs to be reach by all actors of the Bitcoin market or you continue pretending that the demand of consumers & merchants for lower cost transactions will move the needle which it won't in that case if they "fork" it will be in their own cheap little altcoin.


You love going around in circles, don't you? 

As knight22 already explained a few times, there's no such thing as perfect consensus.

Do you refuse to accept the possibility that an economic majority will have their way and increase the blocksize even though you don't agree?

isn't the very idea of an "economic majority" tied to consensus? if the miners don't support industry players, that doesn't mean the miners can be ignored. the lower we place the threshold for a hard fork, the more likely we will see a "civil war" play out as Nick Szabo pointed out. that's why hashing power is paramount to the concerns of Bitpay et al.
legendary
Activity: 1302
Merit: 1008
Core dev leaves me neg feedback #abuse #political


Look Peter it's quite simple, either you accept that for the block size to increase consensus needs to be reach by all actors of the Bitcoin market or you continue pretending that the demand of consumers & merchants for lower cost transactions will move the needle which it won't in that case if they "fork" it will be in their own cheap little altcoin.


You love going around in circles, don't you? 

As knight22 already explained a few times, there's no such thing as perfect consensus.

Do you refuse to accept the possibility that an economic majority will have their way and increase the blocksize even though you don't agree?
hero member
Activity: 644
Merit: 504
Bitcoin replaces central, not commercial, banks
We should be able to test this empirically: if the theory is true, then, for example, we should never have a sustained period in the future where the total fees collected by miners is significantly greater than the aggregate losses due to orphaning.

1) We definitely should. We must let the pressure build up and see if the network effect alone can hold it. Maybe even let the pressure leave for a while.


The question is whether or not we have a choice.  My prediction is that there will never be a sustained period in the future where aggregate fees are significantly greater than aggregate losses due to orphaning.  The protocol will fork (or demand will leak somewhere else) before this happens.

Let's say "sustained" = more than 6 months and "significantly greater" = more than double.


A protocol fork implies enormously more costs and potential loss than a pivot toward alternatives. Please don't pretend the two are proportional options. They are not.


Personally, I see the protocol fork as the path of least resistance.

Anyways, regardless of what either of us think, my hypothesis can easily be proven wrong. All it would take is for aggregate fees to be significantly higher than aggregate losses due to orphaning over a sustained period.  I believe this will not happen in the future.

But time will tell.

 Roll Eyes

Yeah sure, bootstrapping a new economy surely is the path of least resistance, not cashing out to fiat to make whatever purchase you're trying to make....

By protocol fork, I just mean increasing the block size limit to satisfy demand.  I don't understand how that implies "bootstrapping a new economy."  Can you explain?

Look Peter it's quite simple, either you accept that for the block size to increase consensus needs to be reach by all actors of the Bitcoin market or you continue pretending that the demand of consumers & merchants for lower cost transactions will move the needle which it won't in that case if they "fork" it will be in their own cheap little altcoin.
legendary
Activity: 3948
Merit: 3191
Leave no FUD unchallenged
We should be able to test this empirically: if the theory is true, then, for example, we should never have a sustained period in the future where the total fees collected by miners is significantly greater than the aggregate losses due to orphaning.

1) We definitely should. We must let the pressure build up and see if the network effect alone can hold it. Maybe even let the pressure leave for a while.


The question is whether or not we have a choice.  My prediction is that there will never be a sustained period in the future where aggregate fees are significantly greater than aggregate losses due to orphaning.  The protocol will fork (or demand will leak somewhere else) before this happens.

Let's say "sustained" = more than 6 months and "significantly greater" = more than double.


A protocol fork implies enormously more costs and potential loss than a pivot toward alternatives. Please don't pretend the two are proportional options. They are not.


Personally, I see the protocol fork as the path of least resistance.

Anyways, regardless of what either of us think, my hypothesis can easily be proven wrong. All it would take is for aggregate fees to be significantly higher than aggregate losses due to orphaning over a sustained period.  I believe this will not happen in the future.

But time will tell.

 Roll Eyes

Yeah sure, bootstrapping a new economy surely is the path of least resistance, not cashing out to fiat to make whatever purchase you're trying to make....

By protocol fork, I just mean increasing the block size limit to satisfy demand.  I don't understand how that implies "bootstrapping a new economy."  Can you explain?

I'm not sure which it is.  Either they think the economic majority will side with them in the event of a fork, or they're cocky enough to believe that they are the economic majority all by themselves.   Roll Eyes
hero member
Activity: 504
Merit: 500
Bitcoin XT was a real test to the community. I'm happy decentralization came out as a winner.
legendary
Activity: 1162
Merit: 1010
We should be able to test this empirically: if the theory is true, then, for example, we should never have a sustained period in the future where the total fees collected by miners is significantly greater than the aggregate losses due to orphaning.

1) We definitely should. We must let the pressure build up and see if the network effect alone can hold it. Maybe even let the pressure leave for a while.


The question is whether or not we have a choice.  My prediction is that there will never be a sustained period in the future where aggregate fees are significantly greater than aggregate losses due to orphaning.  The protocol will fork (or demand will leak somewhere else) before this happens.

Let's say "sustained" = more than 6 months and "significantly greater" = more than double.


A protocol fork implies enormously more costs and potential loss than a pivot toward alternatives. Please don't pretend the two are proportional options. They are not.


Personally, I see the protocol fork as the path of least resistance.

Anyways, regardless of what either of us think, my hypothesis can easily be proven wrong. All it would take is for aggregate fees to be significantly higher than aggregate losses due to orphaning over a sustained period.  I believe this will not happen in the future.

But time will tell.

 Roll Eyes

Yeah sure, bootstrapping a new economy surely is the path of least resistance, not cashing out to fiat to make whatever purchase you're trying to make....

By protocol fork, I just mean increasing the block size limit to satisfy demand.  I don't understand how that implies "bootstrapping a new economy."  Can you explain?
hero member
Activity: 644
Merit: 504
Bitcoin replaces central, not commercial, banks
We should be able to test this empirically: if the theory is true, then, for example, we should never have a sustained period in the future where the total fees collected by miners is significantly greater than the aggregate losses due to orphaning.

1) We definitely should. We must let the pressure build up and see if the network effect alone can hold it. Maybe even let the pressure leave for a while.


The question is whether or not we have a choice.  My prediction is that there will never be a sustained period in the future where aggregate fees are significantly greater than aggregate losses due to orphaning.  The protocol will fork (or demand will leak somewhere else) before this happens.

Let's say "sustained" = more than 6 months and "significantly greater" = more than double.


A protocol fork implies enormously more costs and potential loss than a pivot toward alternatives. Please don't pretend the two are proportional options. They are not.


Personally, I see the protocol fork as the path of least resistance.

Anyways, regardless of what either of us think, my hypothesis can easily be proven wrong. All it would take is for aggregate fees to be significantly higher than aggregate losses due to orphaning over a sustained period.  I believe this will not happen in the future.

But time will tell.

 Roll Eyes

Yeah sure, bootstrapping a new economy surely is the path of least resistance, not cashing out to fiat to make whatever purchase you're trying to make....
legendary
Activity: 1162
Merit: 1010
We should be able to test this empirically: if the theory is true, then, for example, we should never have a sustained period in the future where the total fees collected by miners is significantly greater than the aggregate losses due to orphaning.

1) We definitely should. We must let the pressure build up and see if the network effect alone can hold it. Maybe even let the pressure leave for a while.


The question is whether or not we have a choice.  My prediction is that there will never be a sustained period in the future where aggregate fees are significantly greater than aggregate losses due to orphaning.  The protocol will fork (or demand will leak somewhere else) before this happens.

Let's say "sustained" = more than 6 months and "significantly greater" = more than double.


A protocol fork implies enormously more costs and potential loss than a pivot toward alternatives. Please don't pretend the two are proportional options. They are not.


Personally, I see the protocol fork as the path of least resistance.

Anyways, regardless of what either of us think, my hypothesis can easily be proven wrong. All it would take is for aggregate fees to be significantly higher than aggregate losses due to orphaning over a sustained period.  I don't believe this will happen.

But time will tell.



legendary
Activity: 2156
Merit: 1072
Crypto is the separation of Power and State.
an unabashed appeal to authority.

I appealed to expertise, not "authority."

It's very sad you lack the basic intelligence required to understand the day-and-night difference between expert opinion and argumentum ad baculum.

No wonder you are still pushing XT's dead, utterly #REKT fail-agenda.
hero member
Activity: 644
Merit: 504
Bitcoin replaces central, not commercial, banks
We should be able to test this empirically: if the theory is true, then, for example, we should never have a sustained period in the future where the total fees collected by miners is significantly greater than the aggregate losses due to orphaning.

1) We definitely should. We must let the pressure build up and see if the network effect alone can hold it. Maybe even let the pressure leave for a while.


The question is whether or not we have a choice.  My prediction is that there will never be a sustained period in the future where aggregate fees are significantly greater than aggregate losses due to orphaning.  The protocol will fork (or demand will leak somewhere else) before this happens.

Let's say "sustained" = more than 6 months and "significantly greater" = more than double.


A protocol fork implies enormously more costs and potential loss than a pivot toward alternatives. Please don't pretend the two are proportional options. They are not.

The problem with your logic here is that the users responsible for the majority of Bitcoin's monetary base are not deterred by or concerned with transactions fees. Therefore what you are essentially suggesting is that those users who are not comfortable with paying for the security and the services of the network would essentially bootstrap their own altcoin.

Seeing as they are necessarily less wealthy individuals who'd have a hard time supporting an economy with their own pockets I'm betting they will think twice before doing this.
legendary
Activity: 1162
Merit: 1010
We should be able to test this empirically: if the theory is true, then, for example, we should never have a sustained period in the future where the total fees collected by miners is significantly greater than the aggregate losses due to orphaning.

1) We definitely should. We must let the pressure build up and see if the network effect alone can hold it. Maybe even let the pressure leave for a while.


The question is whether or not we have a choice.  My prediction is that there will never be a sustained period in the future where aggregate fees are significantly greater than aggregate losses due to orphaning.  The protocol will fork (or demand will leak somewhere else) before this happens.

Let's say "sustained" = more than 6 months and "significantly greater" = more than double.
full member
Activity: 167
Merit: 100
...Are you telling me that you did not have to set up an back account to receive your credit card? Did it fall from the sky loaded with money? The procedure is seemingly similar aside from some fees when buying. Basically you had to set up a bank account and receive your CC. Then you proceed to load it with money and use it.
With Bitcoin, you set up an account at a exchange. Then you proceed to load it with money and buy Bitcoin. Then you transfer back your Bitcoin and...

You don't load a credit card up with money. When you spend money on a credit card, you are borrowing money when you pay.

In trading terms, when you buy an asset using a credit card, you are shorting (selling via borrowing) the currency the credit card is in and going long the asset you purchased. If your credit card is in US dollars, for example, and you purchase a $100,000 Mercedes car with it, you are now short $100,000 US dollars and long a $100,000 Mercedes.

If the value of the Mercedes doubles before your payment is due and you can sell it by then for $200,000 (doubtful) and make your $100,000 monthly payment to pay back the credit card loan, then you will have made $100,000 profit and it was all borrowed money. This is not a very realistic example as most people don't use credit cards to buy assets they believe will appreciate in value. They usually use them to pay bills or buy non-performing assets. However, it is true that when you use one to purchase an asset, you are going long that asset and shorting the dollar until your payment is made to close out the loan.

Credit cards are different from debit cards. A debit card is not a loan, the purchase amount is deducted from the bank account associated with the card.

Because credit cards are loans, they generally have higher fees than debit cards. One big reason is because not everyone who borrows money pays it back. Some people buy a bunch of stuff on credit cards and run away and/or file bankruptcy.

And that's one of the reasons credit cards have higher interest rates than other payment methods. You are not spending your money, you are spending their money.

There are a variety of other differences between cards, such as the amount of buyer protection you have if someone rips you off. More details are here:

http://science.howstuffworks.com/debit-cards1.htm
jr. member
Activity: 42
Merit: 1
We should be able to test this empirically: if the theory is true, then, for example, we should never have a sustained period in the future where the total fees collected by miners is significantly greater than the aggregate losses due to orphaning.

Emphasis mine.

1) We definitely should. We must let the pressure build up and see if the network effect alone can hold it. Maybe even let the pressure leave for a while.
2) There is one little detail here, removal of the limit on block size makes the orphaning a non-issue as it opens the door for targeting higher bandwidth layers (those fiber optics under the ocean are waiting Smiley) where profit-driven miners would be incentivized to move sooner than later. They have little incentives to do that at the moment as the costs won't justify the effect with the current 1MB limit in place.



There are two costs that play against each other with Bitcoin.

1) First is the cost to transact on a single unified ledger that comes from the limit on block size (which incurs tx fees).
2) Second is cost to run a full validator of the protocol rules and transactions from home (ever growing blockchain).

The more transactions are allowed in the block the cheaper they become, but the costs of validating get higher as a result (and vice versa).



As of right now Bitcoin gives us two "keys" for our monetary sovereignty.

1) First is the "private key" from our coins that we can generate in a permissionless way and then use to receive and send money.
2) Second is the "key" to validate the fact that money we hold and use operate as intended by having permissionless access to blockchain.

The fees we pay in the network is the price to hold the second key, don't lose it!

Well put.

Smiley
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