Thanks @Fatoshi. I am a mix of pragmatic and rebellious. Well I won't be doing an ICO, so if and when you decide to buy some tokens, then it will be for an open source project that is already live. And let's hope we can do something that really makes an impact on more people than Bitcoin has thus far. And that means hopefully it will be the product of the effect and reward of a lot of hyper talented and motivated people, not just myself. I am just the initial force to get the snowball rolling downhill.
The key is making it scalable while maintaining decentralization (which no one else knows how to do, even Lightning Networks won't scale decentralized). And making the blockchain open so anyone can build stuff on the blockchain (which then should drive the number of developers on the open source blockchain project as well). And a monetization model that doesn't require all the
app vendors to create their own unwanted tokens as in the current Ethereum "smart contract' ICO craze. And more...
Afaics, my blockchain and consensus design eliminates the huge sunk costs of PoW mining farms, while being more secure. It doesn't have the nothing-at-stake problems of PoS nor the "can get stuck requiring a hard fork" problems of Byzantine agreement (e.g. TenderMint/Cosmos, Byteball, Ethereum's Casper, etc). Again I can't easily summarize this design, because the devil is in the details, so you'll just have to read the whitepaper whenever I decide to publish it.
Here is a hint from the whitepaper and probably the most significant hint I've ever released:
Even if one concluded the transacting participants only have an altruist-prime incentive to do validation spot checks, it is not an undersupplied public good[^subjectivity] because there is no practical incentive, nor plausible way to verify and pay participants, to not do it. It seems plausible that there is the additional motivation of jealously (aka “crab bucket mentality”[^crab-mentality]) in that any participant or faction wouldn’t want to allow any other participant or faction to be able to cheat to obtain an (especially non-meritorious) advantage. A generative essence that seems to drive the viability of decentralized systems is that if no factions are powerful enough to overcome the checks of the other factions, then the resultant Nash equilibrium is a stalemate that preserves decentralization and meritocracy, which is the antithesis of a power vacuum such as is otherwise the case with politics and democracy.[^ESR] [^voting]
Note I am hoping someone more skilled than myself at the task of technical writing, could rewrite the whitepaper before it is published. Also simply because writing it and thus rewriting is a huge distracting task and I have far too much to do.