Cypherdorc (blew a fuse and) locked his thread, so we must continue the discussion over here...
Chicken-shit asshole. (Actually, I suspect it was a temporary mistake but I didn't seen an explanation. And it's fun to antagonize the guy.)
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Let me preface my remarks by stating that I personally am fixated on keeping activity on the 'mainchain' as minimal as possible. This to keep it super lite and the entire support infrastructure distributable mostly in terms of messenging bandwidth. I want to minimize transactions.
Economically, I feel that if an on-chain transaction represents thousands of off-chain transactions, very generous fees can be paid to core infrastructure supporters while end-users continue to pay a tiny fee (if any) for their coffee purchases. We then have a win/win.
The movement of coin assets from one chain to other can't realistically be done piecemeal at a moment's notice via the SPV (as you point out far too much risk to allow that), instead atomic swaps should be used.
The SPV proofs should only be used for those willing to accede to very long contest period, say 30 days or so.
I don't really understand your atomic swap ideas with out more context. Specifically, swap what for what? I suppose BTC for sidecoin? If so, this is still activity on the mainchain which I wish to avoid. With enough 'lossyness', I can imagine some efficiency, and I suppose that this is where your 30-day figures come from. Fine, but it still seems as kludgy as anything I could come up with in my early attempts.
Speculators are not going to do this for free. Thus rapidly moving assets between side chains is going to be lossy, i.e. you won't get 1 BTC for the 1 BTC you swapped (when demand exceeds supply) but going the other direction you will get more than 1 BTC (when supply exceeds demand) unless of course you accede to the long contest period.
Side chains which enforce a longer minimum contest period will have more lossy atomic swaps, but gain confidence.
I am going to notify Adam and Gregory that they need to be more realistic and incorporate this into their whitepaper.
Edit: reorganizations can also impact atomic swaps, but the losses are localized to only the parties to the swap, thus no run on the coin in general. Swap participants should set timelocks with duration appropriate to the risks they want to take.
Speculators are the last people I would give much of a shit about (although I am one myself and intend to continue to be.)
What hit me recently was that a single transaction channel set-up would make my outlay (say 1 BTC to a micro-tipping sidechain) undesirable and anyone could verify this in the mainchain.
Yes, a market might occur for dept. That is, someone might buy my dedicated channel funds for a discount just as someone might loan someone money who is already in debt. This could indeed 'inflate' the Bitcoin monetary base, but it probably would not be that big a deal. The transparency inherent in a public blockchain makes it unlikely that 'debt' would be overpriced, and it would make practical the market itself would doing it's own form of 'tainting' on UTXO's under control of unreliable parties.
I don't fully comprehend the channel actions as outlined by some of the more competent designers at this time, but it does seem to me that with two-part keys and time-lock programming, a lot of the activity to facilitate fine-grained channel flow control actually could happen off-chain. Really interesting stuff.
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I have always had a high respect for the efficiencies that lossy systems can achieve. This from my experience in engineering. I would say that most parties playing in the reserve currency sphere are able and willing to play under a lossy paradigmn. It's just standard risk management which they are competent to do. The main thing they need is transparency.
On the other end of the spectrum, people who can lose only one dollar because they have only one dollar can also accept a lossy system. This because if they lose 100% of their wealth they would have spent it on an energy drink the next morning anyway and needed to make another dollar picking up cans the next day no matter what.
LN seems to appreciate and adopt some of these paradigms to my delight.
It is still the case that for the many use-cases where lossy systems are not applicable, native Bitcoin remains an option (we hope.)