Topic: Russia Was Prepared to Withstand Sanctions. Why Wasn't Europe Prepared to Impose - page 6. (Read 800 times)
March 31, 2022, 12:03:17 PM
Every governments just focused on their temporary goals and spend more time on how to keep their place in the next election meanwhile Putin had some long term goals and still doing it in the more effective ways that is why western countries still dependent on the Russia's oil while they may brought some alternative to that but now they will prepare for it but again it will take a decade until that Russia has the power.
March 31, 2022, 10:01:12 AM
The US and Eastern Europe has been criticizing the growing dependence on Russian fossil fuels for a long time. But Western Europe wanted to reduce American influence, and they believed that they can contain Russian aggression by being friendly. They miscalculated heavily, because Putin viewed friendliness as softness and invitation for more aggression.
I wouldn't say that Russia was fully prepared for sanctions. A significant part of their 600 billion reserves got frozen, because it was held in the west. Russia heavily relies on imported components for manufacturing nearly anything, so their military-industrial complex got hit very hard with sanctions.
Also, the full effect of sanctions will become clear in 1-2 years. But some of the Russian top officials already admitted that they didn't expect sanctions to be this harsh.
I wouldn't say that Russia was fully prepared for sanctions. A significant part of their 600 billion reserves got frozen, because it was held in the west. Russia heavily relies on imported components for manufacturing nearly anything, so their military-industrial complex got hit very hard with sanctions.
Also, the full effect of sanctions will become clear in 1-2 years. But some of the Russian top officials already admitted that they didn't expect sanctions to be this harsh.
March 31, 2022, 09:46:37 AM
A new Indo-Russian transaction platform may be up this week
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/a-new-indo-russian-transaction-platform-may-be-up-this-week/articleshow/90551703.cms
"Russia's state-owned development bank VEB and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) have likely finalized an alternative transaction platform to facilitate bilateral trade after Western sanctions firewalled Moscow's access to the globally used Swift banking platform, two people familiar with the matter told ET."
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/a-new-indo-russian-transaction-platform-may-be-up-this-week/articleshow/90551703.cms
"Russia's state-owned development bank VEB and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) have likely finalized an alternative transaction platform to facilitate bilateral trade after Western sanctions firewalled Moscow's access to the globally used Swift banking platform, two people familiar with the matter told ET."
March 31, 2022, 06:14:01 AM
He has spent decades projecting an illusion that Russia is to be feared, however it has barely made any progress in Ukraine - it would get annihilated by NATO if it ever tried to invade anywhere else in Europe.
I'm not a Putin supporter.
My goal is to be as accurate as possible about the situation in ukraine. As accurate information is important to understand the nature of reality.
What stands out the most about russia's invasion of ukraine, is its efforts to conduct the operation on a shoestring budget. Russia primarily used conscripts who are paid a reduced wage, in contrast to professional soldiers. Russia avoided using air support to eliminate higher costs associated with jet fighters and smart bomb ordnance. From the beginning, it seems russia prioritized cost savings to wage a war that would put as little strain on its economy as possible.
Russia was definitely hit hard by sanctions and other financial measures taken against them. But looking at their approach, they were preparing for this from the start of the war.
It may also be fair to say that should russia manage to solve enough of its economic troubles, it will return once again to its invasion.
Most sources I have seen credit russia with having the #2 military in the world. I wonder if they are underrated.
I do not think Hydrogen is a Putin supporter. He is just putting forward some arguments and figures and it is good to think what and how Putin's entourage sees the situation because, while we must keep hopes and spirit high, it is also necessary to understand the economic reality and how to take advantage of opportunities and mitigate the risks.
There needs to be high morale and determination as well as strategic analytic thinking.
March 30, 2022, 06:30:29 PM
He has spent decades projecting an illusion that Russia is to be feared, however it has barely made any progress in Ukraine - it would get annihilated by NATO if it ever tried to invade anywhere else in Europe.
I'm not a Putin supporter.
My goal is to be as accurate as possible about the situation in ukraine. As accurate information is important to understand the nature of reality.
What stands out the most about russia's invasion of ukraine, is its efforts to conduct the operation on a shoestring budget. Russia primarily used conscripts who are paid a reduced wage, in contrast to professional soldiers. Russia avoided using air support to eliminate higher costs associated with jet fighters and smart bomb ordnance. From the beginning, it seems russia prioritized cost savings to wage a war that would put as little strain on its economy as possible.
Russia was definitely hit hard by sanctions and other financial measures taken against them. But looking at their approach, they were preparing for this from the start of the war.
It may also be fair to say that should russia manage to solve enough of its economic troubles, it will return once again to its invasion.
Most sources I have seen credit russia with having the #2 military in the world. I wonder if they are underrated.
March 30, 2022, 02:42:41 PM
....
Interesting write up on the russia ukraine situation from last month.
It appears europe's reliance on russian oil has grown from the conflict in crimea in 2014 leading to the present. Rather than taking steps to reduce reliance on russian oil, europe has taken the opposite precedent. Making it even harder to decouple from russian oil today. The author of this piece goes on to criticize europe for not greening its economy to become less reliant on russian oil. I myself am not a fan of these bold criticisms, unless they come before hindsight being 20/20.
The charts posted detail russia's efforts to harden its economy against economic sanctions from years past, to the present. Some of us may remember reading about russian efforts to prepare for SWIFT bans a long time ago. Russia never considered the possibility of peace in ukraine and definitely spent the past 10+ years preparing for an eventual war. There is a question of why the rest of the world was not preparing. Russia appears to have caught everyone asleep and unprepared.
Interesting write up on the russia ukraine situation from last month.
It appears europe's reliance on russian oil has grown from the conflict in crimea in 2014 leading to the present. Rather than taking steps to reduce reliance on russian oil, europe has taken the opposite precedent. Making it even harder to decouple from russian oil today. The author of this piece goes on to criticize europe for not greening its economy to become less reliant on russian oil. I myself am not a fan of these bold criticisms, unless they come before hindsight being 20/20.
The charts posted detail russia's efforts to harden its economy against economic sanctions from years past, to the present. Some of us may remember reading about russian efforts to prepare for SWIFT bans a long time ago. Russia never considered the possibility of peace in ukraine and definitely spent the past 10+ years preparing for an eventual war. There is a question of why the rest of the world was not preparing. Russia appears to have caught everyone asleep and unprepared.
Thanks for the analysis, really interesting material.
I'll add a bit about the issue of "growing pressure on the EU through oil and gas prices". Here everything is simple and everything is complicated. If you did not know, then Russia, since the 1990s, has "invested" huge amounts of money in the political elites of Europe and then the EU. Many politicians of the top composition, and even entire parties, in fact, carried out the orders of the Kremlin, beat the centers of influence and lobbying for the interests of the Kremlin politicians. Take Germany as an example, which in public is the center of democracies and the rule of law, and on the other hand, the obedient slave of the Kremlin's gas and oil traders. Gerhard Schroeder was bought long ago and of high quality, and for the last decades he has been sitting comfortably receiving millions of euros a month for what he did for Moscow in his time. Frau Merkel, if not for the war with Ukraine, most likely would have moved to a warm office in Moscow, in one of the structures of Gazprom. All their actions were aimed at solving the problems of the Kremlin, under the guise of "Germany's independent policy." The same politicians - there are prostitutes in other EU countries, in sufficient numbers. And so now, the energy market of Central Europe, "unexpectedly" turned out to be highly dependent on Russian supplies. Although everyone perfectly understood that such a monopolization is a lever of political, military and financial influence or even terror, which has already been proven more than once by Russia itself. And now some politicians continue to play the "oh, we can't give up Russian gas" game.
March 30, 2022, 02:19:26 PM
Quote
It has been eight years since Russia last invaded Ukraine. What has changed, and what has not?
Russian exports of oil and natural gas are an essential source of hard currency that helps cover the cost of importing manufactured goods. Russia’s oil, gas, and coal exports are also an essential source of energy for European consumers and businesses, without which they couldn’t generate electricity, fuel their vehicles, or heat their homes and offices.
This entanglement limits the West’s ability to penalize Russian aggression financially. Yes, cutting Russia off from the global financial system would devastate the Russian economy and impose severe hardship on the Russian civilian population, but it would also force Europeans to slash their energy consumption.
Milder sanctions could protect Europe’s access to oil, coal, and gas, but their impact on the Russian government’s behavior would be commensurately smaller. The Putin regime has spent years acclimating Russians to material deprivation and it has also built up substantial financial buffers. Not for the first time, conservative macroeconomic and regulatory policies have shielded a revisionist regime from international pressure.
There was nothing that Europeans could have done about the Russian government’s decision to impose severe costs on its civilian population for the sake of maintaining its own flexibility. But Europeans can and should be blamed for becoming even more reliant on Russian fossil fuel exports since the 2014 invasion of Ukraine. They wasted nearly a decade when they could have been greening their economies and also increasing the security of their own neighborhood. Ukrainians—and others—will now have to live with the consequences.
Russian exports of oil and natural gas are an essential source of hard currency that helps cover the cost of importing manufactured goods. Russia’s oil, gas, and coal exports are also an essential source of energy for European consumers and businesses, without which they couldn’t generate electricity, fuel their vehicles, or heat their homes and offices.
This entanglement limits the West’s ability to penalize Russian aggression financially. Yes, cutting Russia off from the global financial system would devastate the Russian economy and impose severe hardship on the Russian civilian population, but it would also force Europeans to slash their energy consumption.
Milder sanctions could protect Europe’s access to oil, coal, and gas, but their impact on the Russian government’s behavior would be commensurately smaller. The Putin regime has spent years acclimating Russians to material deprivation and it has also built up substantial financial buffers. Not for the first time, conservative macroeconomic and regulatory policies have shielded a revisionist regime from international pressure.
There was nothing that Europeans could have done about the Russian government’s decision to impose severe costs on its civilian population for the sake of maintaining its own flexibility. But Europeans can and should be blamed for becoming even more reliant on Russian fossil fuel exports since the 2014 invasion of Ukraine. They wasted nearly a decade when they could have been greening their economies and also increasing the security of their own neighborhood. Ukrainians—and others—will now have to live with the consequences.
There is some very confused and wishful thinking by the original poster, kinda losing respect when posting a garbage clickbait title like that. It has finally come to light that you're just a brainless shill for Putin. You conveniently pick out elements that support your theory while totally ignoring how devastated the Russian economy is looking like in reality. Putin thought the west was going to put out a whimper, but he was shocked by the deafening roar and will have stunted the Russian economy for decades to come. His legacy is now as a military joke, when he could have simply kept the pressure on and not shown the utter incompetence of Russian tactics. He has spent decades projecting an illusion that Russia is to be feared, however it has barely made any progress in Ukraine - it would get annihilated by NATO if it ever tried to invade anywhere else in Europe. Even funnier is half of the war chest you claim is a safety net is now frozen and beyond the reach of the Russian government, hopefully to be seized and given to Ukraine for rebuilding after this shameful war.
May Russia, this supposed "Super Power" continue getting whooped by Ukraine. Slava Ukraini.
March 30, 2022, 12:25:20 PM
US national debt
https://www.usdebtclock.org/
America built the most powerful economy in the world because it bought resources and the best specialists in the world with printed dollars.
For many years, Russia was a colony that sold its resources cheaply, and now these sanctions hit the European economy even more painfully.
https://www.usdebtclock.org/
America built the most powerful economy in the world because it bought resources and the best specialists in the world with printed dollars.
For many years, Russia was a colony that sold its resources cheaply, and now these sanctions hit the European economy even more painfully.
March 30, 2022, 06:19:52 AM
To be honest, I thought long time ago that Germany somehow was not doing the right thing linking so much with Putin's Russia. They saw a market from which both nations could profit - which was right - an a supplier that had plenty of raw materials for the always hungry German industry. I was convinced that they were seeing something I did not or had some short of leverage that I was not aware of. But it just turned out to be that they actually expected Putin to act rationally. Ah... Germans... always so logical that they do not seem to understand the Tzar's way.
Anyway, we are where we are and ready or not, EU and US are taking a reasonably strong stance and I really hope everyone has learned the lesson about diversification of critical supplies. Foot the bill, go on to other restaurants.
Anyway, we are where we are and ready or not, EU and US are taking a reasonably strong stance and I really hope everyone has learned the lesson about diversification of critical supplies. Foot the bill, go on to other restaurants.
March 30, 2022, 03:26:43 AM
Who funded Russia? Are they not the Wests? After Russia invaded Crimea in 2014, the Wests are still buying oils and fossil fuels from Russia. They showed they depended on Russia when there are many available alternatives. West can be said to be the cause of the war. I expect all imports from Russia into Western nations should have ceased since many years ago. Then, Russia would have not have such power and weaponry they have today.
March 30, 2022, 03:16:32 AM
For me, everything is clear. Europe and America are accustomed to considering themselves the leading countries that can very easily manipulate all other countries. But the pressure on Russia did not begin even in 2014; hatred for Russians is born deep in history. But as the Russians say: "everything that does not kill us makes us stronger" Therefore, the Russian government, feeling another negative influence, as well as a dictatorship from the West, has always understood that it is necessary to prepare for the fact that sooner or later, this abscess of hatred will breakthrough. And as an example of today's events, the Russians were right.
They are ready for all sanctions, as they probably worked out all the situations that could happen in the future. But all other countries, mistakenly taking on the role of head of the world, did not take any action, always thinking that power and strength would always be theirs. But now everyone understands that this Russia is not so weak, for which it was taken earlier.
They are ready for all sanctions, as they probably worked out all the situations that could happen in the future. But all other countries, mistakenly taking on the role of head of the world, did not take any action, always thinking that power and strength would always be theirs. But now everyone understands that this Russia is not so weak, for which it was taken earlier.
March 29, 2022, 06:18:17 PM
Quote
It has been eight years since Russia last invaded Ukraine. What has changed, and what has not?
Russian exports of oil and natural gas are an essential source of hard currency that helps cover the cost of importing manufactured goods. Russia’s oil, gas, and coal exports are also an essential source of energy for European consumers and businesses, without which they couldn’t generate electricity, fuel their vehicles, or heat their homes and offices.
This entanglement limits the West’s ability to penalize Russian aggression financially. Yes, cutting Russia off from the global financial system would devastate the Russian economy and impose severe hardship on the Russian civilian population, but it would also force Europeans to slash their energy consumption.
Milder sanctions could protect Europe’s access to oil, coal, and gas, but their impact on the Russian government’s behavior would be commensurately smaller. The Putin regime has spent years acclimating Russians to material deprivation and it has also built up substantial financial buffers. Not for the first time, conservative macroeconomic and regulatory policies have shielded a revisionist regime from international pressure.
There was nothing that Europeans could have done about the Russian government’s decision to impose severe costs on its civilian population for the sake of maintaining its own flexibility. But Europeans can and should be blamed for becoming even more reliant on Russian fossil fuel exports since the 2014 invasion of Ukraine. They wasted nearly a decade when they could have been greening their economies and also increasing the security of their own neighborhood. Ukrainians—and others—will now have to live with the consequences.
Russia’s Fortress Balance Sheet
The Russian government’s ability to withstand financial pressure was hard-earned. Most obviously, total spending on imported goods and services (in U.S. dollar terms) has consistently been about 25-30% lower than it was before the first invasion of Ukraine. While some of this can be attributed to declines in the world prices of Russia’s oil and gas exports, Western sanctions and Russian domestic policies have also played a role.
The sustained drop in imports has left a mark on Russian consumers’ spending. In inflation-adjusted terms, Russian households spent 12% less in 2016 than they did at the peak in 2014. Even in 2019—before the coronavirus pandemic upended the world economy—Russian consumers were about 2% worse off in material terms than they were before the first invasion of Ukraine.
Meanwhile, Russian businesses and other borrowers responded to external financial pressures—and domestic political ones—by slashing their foreign-currency denominated debt by $200 billion since the beginning of 2014. The Russian government also spent $200 billion adding to its stockpile of reserves (gold, bank deposits, and bonds) since mid-2015.
The net effect is that Russia’s central bank now has enough foreign exchange reserves ($630 billion as of last month) to cover 2021 spending on imports ($368 billion) plus 75% of the country’s entire stock of foreign-currency denominated debt ($353 billion as of 2021Q3).
Much of that debt isn’t even due for at least two years.
None of this, however, is sufficient to protect Russia from the impact of sustained Western sanctions. As the Taliban has discovered, foreign reserves are useless if your counterparties freeze your accounts. Even Russia’s $132 billion in gold reserves couldn’t be used to settle payments if Western banks were banned from touching anything involving Russia.
The Russian government nevertheless feels that it has room to act because it knows that the Europeans need them.
Europe’s Self-Inflicted Error
Shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2014, I wrote that Russia faced a long-term strategic vulnerability: Europeans had the option to squeeze Russia permanently by reducing their reliance on Russian energy exports. At the time, about 60% of Russia’s total export revenues came from sales of crude oil, refined products, and natural gas—and much of that went to Europe.
The Europeans could have built out their capacity to import liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the U.S. and other allies. Even better, the Europeans could have reduced their reliance on fossil fuels altogether by building out more alternative energy generation.
Either way, Gazprom’s network of pipelines would have been transformed from a source of leverage into an albatross. Russia could have found other customers for its gas—most obviously China—but building the necessary transportation infrastructure to compensate for the loss of the European market would take years. Russian oil could be sold elsewhere more easily, but the prices would have to be lower if European demand disappeared.
At first glance, it almost looks as if that’s what happened. Russia’s total export revenues from oil and gas fell from $350 billion/year before the first invasion of Ukraine to $231 billion in 2019. While Russians made up the difference by increasing other exports, including food, the squeeze on energy revenues is real.
But the Russian energy export squeeze had nothing to do with European restraint.
In 2013, the countries of the European Union imported about 135 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Russia. That was equivalent to about 70% of Russia’s total gas exports and equal to 37% of the EU’s worldwide gas imports. Yet in 2019, EU countries imported 166 billion cubic meters of Russian gas—23% more than before the invasion of Ukraine. That was equivalent to 75% of Russia’s total gas exports and 38% of the EU’s worldwide gas imports in 2019.1
European demand for Russian crude oil and refined petroleum products was slightly lower in 2019 than in 2013, but this was offset by surging European demand for Russian coal, which now accounts for almost half of the EU’s coal imports. Put another way, the countries of the EU went from consuming about 62 exajoules of energy in 2013 to 61 exajoules in 2019, while Russia went from supplying 10 exajoules of that energy in 2013 to 11 exajoules in 2019. Despite a slight decline in fossil fuel demand, Russia’s share of the European energy mix rose from 16.5% to 18.5% after the invasion of Ukraine. Europe’s dependence will only increase if the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline comes onstream as planned.
The perverse result is that Europe is at greater risk of Russian pressure than the other way around. Natural gas prices in Europe are now about 5-6 times as high as in the U.S. because Gazprom has been withholding supply and because the lack of LNG terminals has prevented ships from moving gas across the Atlantic.
And while Europeans have made some modest investments in solar and wind energy over the past decade, it hasn’t been nearly enough to make a dent in the overall energy mix, especially after factoring in the impact of the decisions to decommission existing nuclear power plants.
The Europeans seem to have—belatedly—realized the implications of all this. As EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen put it on Tuesday:
I hope her words are heeded.
https://theovershoot.co/p/russia-was-prepared-to-withstand
Russian exports of oil and natural gas are an essential source of hard currency that helps cover the cost of importing manufactured goods. Russia’s oil, gas, and coal exports are also an essential source of energy for European consumers and businesses, without which they couldn’t generate electricity, fuel their vehicles, or heat their homes and offices.
This entanglement limits the West’s ability to penalize Russian aggression financially. Yes, cutting Russia off from the global financial system would devastate the Russian economy and impose severe hardship on the Russian civilian population, but it would also force Europeans to slash their energy consumption.
Milder sanctions could protect Europe’s access to oil, coal, and gas, but their impact on the Russian government’s behavior would be commensurately smaller. The Putin regime has spent years acclimating Russians to material deprivation and it has also built up substantial financial buffers. Not for the first time, conservative macroeconomic and regulatory policies have shielded a revisionist regime from international pressure.
There was nothing that Europeans could have done about the Russian government’s decision to impose severe costs on its civilian population for the sake of maintaining its own flexibility. But Europeans can and should be blamed for becoming even more reliant on Russian fossil fuel exports since the 2014 invasion of Ukraine. They wasted nearly a decade when they could have been greening their economies and also increasing the security of their own neighborhood. Ukrainians—and others—will now have to live with the consequences.
Russia’s Fortress Balance Sheet
The Russian government’s ability to withstand financial pressure was hard-earned. Most obviously, total spending on imported goods and services (in U.S. dollar terms) has consistently been about 25-30% lower than it was before the first invasion of Ukraine. While some of this can be attributed to declines in the world prices of Russia’s oil and gas exports, Western sanctions and Russian domestic policies have also played a role.
The sustained drop in imports has left a mark on Russian consumers’ spending. In inflation-adjusted terms, Russian households spent 12% less in 2016 than they did at the peak in 2014. Even in 2019—before the coronavirus pandemic upended the world economy—Russian consumers were about 2% worse off in material terms than they were before the first invasion of Ukraine.
Meanwhile, Russian businesses and other borrowers responded to external financial pressures—and domestic political ones—by slashing their foreign-currency denominated debt by $200 billion since the beginning of 2014. The Russian government also spent $200 billion adding to its stockpile of reserves (gold, bank deposits, and bonds) since mid-2015.
The net effect is that Russia’s central bank now has enough foreign exchange reserves ($630 billion as of last month) to cover 2021 spending on imports ($368 billion) plus 75% of the country’s entire stock of foreign-currency denominated debt ($353 billion as of 2021Q3).
Much of that debt isn’t even due for at least two years.
None of this, however, is sufficient to protect Russia from the impact of sustained Western sanctions. As the Taliban has discovered, foreign reserves are useless if your counterparties freeze your accounts. Even Russia’s $132 billion in gold reserves couldn’t be used to settle payments if Western banks were banned from touching anything involving Russia.
The Russian government nevertheless feels that it has room to act because it knows that the Europeans need them.
Europe’s Self-Inflicted Error
Shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2014, I wrote that Russia faced a long-term strategic vulnerability: Europeans had the option to squeeze Russia permanently by reducing their reliance on Russian energy exports. At the time, about 60% of Russia’s total export revenues came from sales of crude oil, refined products, and natural gas—and much of that went to Europe.
The Europeans could have built out their capacity to import liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the U.S. and other allies. Even better, the Europeans could have reduced their reliance on fossil fuels altogether by building out more alternative energy generation.
Either way, Gazprom’s network of pipelines would have been transformed from a source of leverage into an albatross. Russia could have found other customers for its gas—most obviously China—but building the necessary transportation infrastructure to compensate for the loss of the European market would take years. Russian oil could be sold elsewhere more easily, but the prices would have to be lower if European demand disappeared.
At first glance, it almost looks as if that’s what happened. Russia’s total export revenues from oil and gas fell from $350 billion/year before the first invasion of Ukraine to $231 billion in 2019. While Russians made up the difference by increasing other exports, including food, the squeeze on energy revenues is real.
But the Russian energy export squeeze had nothing to do with European restraint.
In 2013, the countries of the European Union imported about 135 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Russia. That was equivalent to about 70% of Russia’s total gas exports and equal to 37% of the EU’s worldwide gas imports. Yet in 2019, EU countries imported 166 billion cubic meters of Russian gas—23% more than before the invasion of Ukraine. That was equivalent to 75% of Russia’s total gas exports and 38% of the EU’s worldwide gas imports in 2019.1
European demand for Russian crude oil and refined petroleum products was slightly lower in 2019 than in 2013, but this was offset by surging European demand for Russian coal, which now accounts for almost half of the EU’s coal imports. Put another way, the countries of the EU went from consuming about 62 exajoules of energy in 2013 to 61 exajoules in 2019, while Russia went from supplying 10 exajoules of that energy in 2013 to 11 exajoules in 2019. Despite a slight decline in fossil fuel demand, Russia’s share of the European energy mix rose from 16.5% to 18.5% after the invasion of Ukraine. Europe’s dependence will only increase if the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline comes onstream as planned.
The perverse result is that Europe is at greater risk of Russian pressure than the other way around. Natural gas prices in Europe are now about 5-6 times as high as in the U.S. because Gazprom has been withholding supply and because the lack of LNG terminals has prevented ships from moving gas across the Atlantic.
And while Europeans have made some modest investments in solar and wind energy over the past decade, it hasn’t been nearly enough to make a dent in the overall energy mix, especially after factoring in the impact of the decisions to decommission existing nuclear power plants.
The Europeans seem to have—belatedly—realized the implications of all this. As EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen put it on Tuesday:
Quote
This crisis shows that Europe is still too dependent on Russian gas. We have to diversify our supplies…We will have to massively invest in renewable energy…because this is a strategic investment in our energy independence.
I hope her words are heeded.
https://theovershoot.co/p/russia-was-prepared-to-withstand
....
Interesting write up on the russia ukraine situation from last month.
It appears europe's reliance on russian oil has grown from the conflict in crimea in 2014 leading to the present. Rather than taking steps to reduce reliance on russian oil, europe has taken the opposite precedent. Making it even harder to decouple from russian oil today. The author of this piece goes on to criticize europe for not greening its economy to become less reliant on russian oil. I myself am not a fan of these bold criticisms, unless they come before hindsight being 20/20.
The charts posted detail russia's efforts to harden its economy against economic sanctions from years past, to the present. Some of us may remember reading about russian efforts to prepare for SWIFT bans a long time ago. Russia never considered the possibility of peace in ukraine and definitely spent the past 10+ years preparing for an eventual war. There is a question of why the rest of the world was not preparing. Russia appears to have caught everyone asleep and unprepared.
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