Is there anyone left in this topic, who's understood what I said? Talking with TwistyPhrasy feels like a loss of my time.
Topic: Wasabi Wallet - Open Source, Noncustodial Coinjoin Software - page 14. (Read 11758 times)
September 04, 2024, 12:10:39 PM
I have had Kruw on my ignore list for a very long time. I checked his answers after I asked him a couple of questions but he refused to address them directly therefore I have ignored him again. He chose to post nonsensical answers therefore as far as I am concerned he is (was and will always be) a waste of space and time. He wants to hold a certain position therefore will never give you a direct answer to your question. Having said that, no blockchain analysis representatives have an account here otherwise maybe they could given an answer.
September 04, 2024, 06:55:30 AM
Is there anyone left in this topic, who's understood what I said? Talking with TwistyPhrasy feels like a loss of my time.
My questions weren't rhetorical. I'll repeat them for you:
Why wouldn't my solutions protect me? Explain how I can still be Sybil attacked if I use the methods I described to you. Start with method 1, explain how the malicious coordinator could defeat it, then go on to method 2, explain how the malicious coordinator could defeat it, then go on to method 3 and explain how a malicious coordinator could defeat it.
Your claim is that a malicious coordinator can exploit the trustless protocol in 3 different ways without being detected, yet you've provided absolutely zero explanation on how the malicious coordinator would achieve this.
I would warn users on using Wasabi, as it's caught into being flawed software: https://twitter.com/wasabistats
Why are you still trying to spread this lie after you already found out that the "wasabistats" Twitter account is flagging remixes as false positive merges? This was already decisively proven to be a hit job account: https://twitter.com/Kruwed/status/1642612625883164672
Then your claim is that other participants in your coinjoin who remix hurts your privacy by decreasing the anonymity of your coins below what is displayed in the client:
Quote from: Twitter Post
Don't trust, verify! 120 of those 132 "output merges" are outputs being remixed, which are detected as false positives since KYCP cannot tell the difference between outputs merged to make a payment and outputs that were remixed in another coinjoin. https://i.ibb.co/YDPGYdC/sheet.png
You have it literally backwards: When coinjoin outputs are remixed, it makes it more difficult to trace funds in the initial coinjoin because it expands the number of possible options where a coin could travel before reaching its final destination.
So my question is, why are you lying about remixing, which increases privacy, by calling it a flaw? It's obvious you are lying about remixing hurting privacy, because if you weren't, then you would be running a coordinator that rejects remixed funds from joining new rounds.
September 04, 2024, 06:10:17 AM
Is there anyone left in this topic, who's understood what I said? Talking with TwistyPhrasy feels like a loss of my time.
September 04, 2024, 05:38:45 AM
Your "solutions" don't protect you against a malicious coordinator
Why wouldn't my solutions protect me? Explain how I can still be Sybil attacked if I use the methods I described to you. Start with method 1, explain how the malicious coordinator could defeat it, then go on to method 2, explain how the malicious coordinator could defeat it, then go on to method 3 and explain how a malicious coordinator could defeat it.
There is this account in Twitter, wasabistats, which has recorded a bunch of Wasabi coinjoins with an anonymity set delivered to nowhere close of what was advertised in the client. The reason is simple, people consolidate their private coins in such a manner that downgrade the anonymity set. For example, if in a 200 input / output coinjoin, 190 of them are consolidated in another transaction, then de-anonymizing the other 10 inputs becomes a much easier problem to solve.
We already covered this, these 190 outputs remixing INCREASES the total anonymity set compared to what is displayed in the client. Why do you continue to lie by claiming that remixing hurts the privacy of others? If you think this is true, why don't you run your own coordinator that rejects all remixing inputs?
September 04, 2024, 05:16:53 AM
- First, register your private coin to the coordinator. If it's accepted, then there's no Sybil attack.
Step 0: Find private coins outside Wasabi. 
I explained to BlackHatCoiner 3 different ways to confirm that a coordinator is not a bad actor
Your "solutions" don't protect you against a malicious coordinator with sufficient liquidity, filling the coinjoin with his inputs, with variable amounts. This way, de-anonymization can be orders of magnitude more effective, through blockchain heuristics like observing input and output clustering. There is this account in Twitter, wasabistats, which has recorded a bunch of Wasabi coinjoins with an anonymity set delivered to nowhere close of what was advertised in the client. The reason is simple, people consolidate their private coins in such a manner that downgrade the anonymity set. For example, if in a 200 input / output coinjoin, 190 of them are consolidated in another transaction, then de-anonymizing the other 10 inputs becomes a much easier problem to solve.
September 04, 2024, 04:38:12 AM
A question for Kruw and the more technical users/people, or regular Wasabi users in the topic. How can we verify for ourselves if a coordinator is a bad actor or not? Because if it's possible to do it, I believe we should have a guide/topic made for newbies and non-technical users, no?
I believe Don't trust, verify should apply in this, instead of us merely squabbling with each other. But if we can't do it, then can we say that coordinators are trusted-third-parties? 🤔
I believe Don't trust, verify should apply in this, instead of us merely squabbling with each other. But if we can't do it, then can we say that coordinators are trusted-third-parties? 🤔
I explained to BlackHatCoiner 3 different ways to confirm that a coordinator is not a bad actor:
My points proved conclusively that coordinators are trustless. You can even use all 3 anti Sybil methods together at once, you don't have to rely on just one:
- First, register your private coin to the coordinator. If it's accepted, then there's no Sybil attack.
- Second, ask your friend to register a coin to the same round. If it's accepted, then you've confirmed for a second time that there's no Sybil attack.
- Third, just to be absolutely sure, back out of the round during signing to check to see if the transaction was built to target you. If the transaction is created, you've confirmed for a third time that there's no Sybil attack.
- First, register your private coin to the coordinator. If it's accepted, then there's no Sybil attack.
- Second, ask your friend to register a coin to the same round. If it's accepted, then you've confirmed for a second time that there's no Sybil attack.
- Third, just to be absolutely sure, back out of the round during signing to check to see if the transaction was built to target you. If the transaction is created, you've confirmed for a third time that there's no Sybil attack.
Other than that, a cautious user should enable "Red Coin Isolation" in Wasabi's coinjoin settings to avoid leaking metadata between two non-private coins if a user happens to disconnect midway through a round.
September 04, 2024, 04:12:49 AM
In the end the decision is yours but in the opinion of many in the forum including myself, you should avoid anything related to Kruw. You would be better off using an alternative co-ordinator instead because his activity and conduct in the forum has alienated himself from most others that post in similar topics.
A question for Kruw and the more technical users/people, or regular Wasabi users in the topic. How can we verify for ourselves if a coordinator is a bad actor or not? Because if it's possible to do it, I believe we should have a guide/topic made for newbies and non-technical users, no?
I believe Don't trust, verify should apply in this, instead of us merely squabbling with each other. But if we can't do it, then can we say that coordinators are trusted-third-parties? 🤔
if the anon set is low on that coordinator and blacklisted UTXO's are allowed into the coinjoin could that potentially flag my non-blacklisted coins as blacklisted?
No one can provide a completely satisfactory answer to this question. Generally, if you use services that discriminate against users based on flawed blockchain analysis results, you could be blacklisted even if you haven't used coinjoin. This could happen because the previous owner of your coins was flagged by their systems, and as a result, you could be flagged too. If I remember correctly, there have been instances where Wasabi coinjoins were flagged as "suspicious" activity by popular centralized exchanges.It's not a question to ask Wasabi, but blockchain analysis firms. However, you might find this write-up useful: https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/blockchain-analytics-is-more-of-an-art-than-science-5464886.
if the anon set is low on that coordinator and blacklisted UTXO's are allowed into the coinjoin could that potentially flag my non-blacklisted coins as blacklisted?
I suppose it is safe to assume your 'non-blacklisted coins' will have a high chance of still being flagged by any Third Party who decides to check up on the source of your Coins and finds out they have recently been through a Coin Join. Particularly if the Blockchain Analysis collaborator of the Service is different from the Blockchain Analysis collaborator of the Coordinator. Is there any scenario where users of Wasabi successfully deposited Coin Joined Bitcoin on a Centralized Exchange several times with no consequences? Currently OpenCoordinator has 0% + free remixing and another important function their website states: no country blocklists, no UTXO blocklists.
if the anon set is low on that coordinator and blacklisted UTXO's are allowed into the coinjoin could that potentially flag my non-blacklisted coins as blacklisted?
Reminder that you can follow the 'Liquisabi' bot on X or Nostr to keep up with liquidity stats for coinjoin coordinators:
https://x.com/LiquiSabi
https://primal.net/p/npub1u4rl3zlfa2efxslhypf4v6r8va5e0c9smxyr5676pxkyk0chn33s0teswa
https://x.com/LiquiSabi
https://primal.net/p/npub1u4rl3zlfa2efxslhypf4v6r8va5e0c9smxyr5676pxkyk0chn33s0teswa
Hello, I'm a new user of wasabi. I usually run manjaro but at the moment I only have windows. I've installed wasabi and I'd like to try the coinjoin function.
I also have a raspiblitz node but it's not running at the moment. Is it safe to use it under windows or would you advise me to wait and do it under linux?
I also have a raspiblitz node but it's not running at the moment. Is it safe to use it under windows or would you advise me to wait and do it under linux?
I use Linux when coinjoining because I know Windows/Mac have bad privacy. Also, at this moment there's a global notice on Bitcointalk warning about a critical Windows security bug: https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2024-38063
This is the list of operating systems that Wasabi supports: https://github.com/WalletWasabi/WalletWasabi/blob/master/WalletWasabi.Documentation/WasabiCompatibility.md
Wasabi is also available in the Start9 app store: https://marketplace.start9.com/wasabi-webtop?api=community-registry.start9.com&name=Community%20Registry
Your coordinator box in the client should be configured to https://coinjoin.kruw.io/
In the end the decision is yours but in the opinion of many in the forum including myself, you should avoid anything related to Kruw. You would be better off using an alternative co-ordinator instead because his activity and conduct in the forum has alienated himself from most others that post in similar topics.
What "activity and conduct"? You claimed before I "embarrassed myself" but never provided any embarrassing quote:
zkSNACKs did not, was not and is not shut down yet when you describe yourself as a "Contributor to Wasabi Wallet" but you are not willing to explain what that means. You already embarrassed yourself with your gutter-level conduct over recent months and now you are embarrassing yourself even further by avoiding to answer.
How did I "embarrass myself"?
Then you claimed I had previously made "gutter level statements" but never provided any of these statements:
I am not taken aback nor surprised by what you posted because as far as I (and other are concerned) there is nothing you could possibly say that would be considered shocking or even more gutter level than your previous statements.
In the end the decision is yours but in the opinion of many in the forum including myself, you should avoid anything related to Kruw. You would be better off using an alternative co-ordinator instead because his activity and conduct in the forum has alienated himself from most others that post in similar topics.
Currently OpenCoordinator has 0% + free remixing and another important function their website states: no country blocklists, no UTXO blocklists.
At the very least you should take a look at other options and keep your options open: https://wabisator.com/
Currently OpenCoordinator has 0% + free remixing and another important function their website states: no country blocklists, no UTXO blocklists.
At the very least you should take a look at other options and keep your options open: https://wabisator.com/
Hello,
I'm a new user of wasabi.
I usually run manjaro but at the moment I only have windows. I've installed wasabi and I'd like to try the coinjoin function.
I also have a raspiblitz node but it's not running at the moment. Is it safe to use it under windows or would you advise me to wait and do it under linux?
I've configured the coordinator with https://kruw.io
is it correct and functional?
I'm a new user of wasabi.
I usually run manjaro but at the moment I only have windows. I've installed wasabi and I'd like to try the coinjoin function.
I also have a raspiblitz node but it's not running at the moment. Is it safe to use it under windows or would you advise me to wait and do it under linux?
I've configured the coordinator with https://kruw.io
is it correct and functional?
Hello,
I'm a new user of wasabi.
I usually run manjaro but at the moment I only have windows. I've installed wasabi and I'd like to try the coinjoin function.
I also have a raspiblitz node but it's not running at the moment. Is it safe to use it under windows or would you advise me to wait and do it under linux?
I've configured the coordinator with https://kruw.io
is it correct and functional?
I'm a new user of wasabi.
I usually run manjaro but at the moment I only have windows. I've installed wasabi and I'd like to try the coinjoin function.
I also have a raspiblitz node but it's not running at the moment. Is it safe to use it under windows or would you advise me to wait and do it under linux?
I've configured the coordinator with https://kruw.io
is it correct and functional?
So from my understanding how it works is wasabi clients post UTXO's they want to coinjoin to the coordinator through tor. Then once the coordinator has a large enough set of UTXO's it will then request output addresses and amounts from each client. After that the cooridnator puts together the transaction and requests each client to sign their corresponding transaction.
This is 95% correct. The only difference is that the output registration isn't triggered immediately once a enough UTXOs join, it's triggered at the end of a fixed time period. If there's not enough UTXOs ready at the end of this time period, then the timer restarts.
Im sure Im missing something but my concern is with tor. Does tor use the same exit node when sending the input UTXO's and output addresses to the coordinator? If so wouldn't that mean the coordinator can deduce that the input UTXO's and output address coming from a specific exit node belong to the same wallet?
Very perceptive question. You are correct that if the same Tor IP address were used to register multiple Bitcoin addresses in the coinjoin transaction then the coordinator could easily link them together. This is why Wasabi uses a separate Tor IP for each input registered and each output registered. So a single client with 10 inputs and 10 outputs in a coinjoin transaction would post these to the coordinator using 20 different IP addresses.
Sorry to interrupt the conversation but I had a questions about the wasabi coordinators protocol.
So from my understanding how it works is wasabi clients post UTXO's they want to coinjoin to the coordinator through tor. Then once the coordinator has a large enough set of UTXO's it will then request output addresses and amounts from each client. After that the cooridnator puts together the transaction and requests each client to sign their corresponding transaction.
Im sure Im missing something but my concern is with tor. Does tor use the same exit node when sending the input UTXO's and output addresses to the coordinator? If so wouldn't that mean the coordinator can deduce that the input UTXO's and output address coming from a specific exit node belong to the same wallet?
So from my understanding how it works is wasabi clients post UTXO's they want to coinjoin to the coordinator through tor. Then once the coordinator has a large enough set of UTXO's it will then request output addresses and amounts from each client. After that the cooridnator puts together the transaction and requests each client to sign their corresponding transaction.
Im sure Im missing something but my concern is with tor. Does tor use the same exit node when sending the input UTXO's and output addresses to the coordinator? If so wouldn't that mean the coordinator can deduce that the input UTXO's and output address coming from a specific exit node belong to the same wallet?
Since the coordinator knows Charlie's coins, he can block him as soon as Alice joins.
This causes the attack to fail while also causing the attack to be detected by both Charlie and Alice.
And all those points you're making are complete garbage.
My points proved conclusively that coordinators are trustless. You can even use all 3 anti Sybil methods together at once, you don't have to rely on just one:
- First, register your private coin to the coordinator. If it's accepted, then there's no Sybil attack.
- Second, ask your friend to register a coin to the same round. If it's accepted, then you've confirmed for a second time that there's no Sybil attack.
- Third, just to be absolutely sure, back out of the round during signing to check to see if the transaction was built to target you. If the transaction is created, you've confirmed for a third time that there's no Sybil attack.
The purpose of a Sybil attack is to PREVENT Alice and Charlie from participating in the same round. If Alice and Charlie just coinjoined together, that's a FAILED Sybil attack, not a SUCCESSFUL Sybil attack.
If you read my message carefully, you'll notice that my point is this: since the coordinator knows Charlie's coins, he can block him as soon as Alice joins. If Alice quits the round again, to "test" that the coordinator isn't Sybil attacking, the coordinator can continue with what he did previously.And all those points you're making are complete garbage. It's amusing that you're presenting them as exceptions, when in reality, the rule is that you don't need friends for a coinjoin, and the vast majority of people don't already have private coins before coinjoining. Let alone, export the PSBT and look on the inputs to see if they really register in the broadcasted coinjoin.
I was asking if sending the CoinJoined outputs to yourself through a multi-hop transaction in Lightning would add an extra layer of privacy. - I'm asking in case coordinators are sanctioned by the government.
Lightning adds an extra layer of privacy when you send to someone else too, so there's no point in "sending coinjoin outputs to yourself".
OK, that would help many people who hold UTXOs that are directly connected to sanctioned addresses gain on-chain fungibility back. I believe those UTXOs held by campaign managers of mixers that had their domains seized should open a channel and send themselves a multi-hop transaction through the Lightning Network. If any ex-members of those campaigns are reading this post, inform your fellow members and your campaign manager.
Trustless as long as me and my buddies come along.
No, it's always completely trustless no matter what, I told you that you already that you can detect a coordinator Sybil attacking EVEN if you have only one UTXO, EVEN if you don't have any friends who will participate, EVEN if this UTXO is known as belonging to the target by chain analysis, AND will force the attacker to bleed fees. Since you didn't address it, I'm going to point out your blatantly wrong conclusion again:
Then Alice is tricked into thinking that the coordinator is not malicious and joins the next round with coordinator's inputs, Charlie's already de-anonymized inputs and her inputs. That's a successful Sybil attack.
The purpose of a Sybil attack is to PREVENT Alice and Charlie from participating in the same round. If Alice and Charlie just coinjoined together, that's a FAILED Sybil attack, not a SUCCESSFUL Sybil attack.
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