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Topic: Wasabi Wallet - Open Source, Noncustodial Coinjoin Software - page 12. (Read 11391 times)

member
Activity: 378
Merit: 93
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how can we access our wallets meanwhile, can you suggest any other wallet where I can open?

The backend was only down for ~12 hours, it's back up now. If there's an outage, you can specify a new MainNetBackendUri that serves compatible filters, I tested these 3 and they all work:

https://coinjoin.kruw.io/
https://api.opencoordinator.org/
https://api.gingerwallet.io/
newbie
Activity: 1
Merit: 0
Wasabi backend currently down due to funding issues... not long after I predict recently that we are going to see Wasabi shutting down their business slowly and gradually.
This is a perfect excuse to have for shutting down Wasabi, nobody can argue with funding issues, since it's obviously not profitable for them.  Roll Eyes

Light the candle (again) please.

how can we access our wallets meanwhile, can you suggest any other wallet where I can open?
sr. member
Activity: 1680
Merit: 379
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I am sure they will be back. Their blockchain analysis partner could be a lender of last resort if no other handler steps up. After all, it's just a loan that will be returned to them with future coinjoins... The honeypot story continues. But they will be stabbed in the back like everyone else once their handlers have had enough.

The backend isn’t related with blockchain analysis. Also, I’m not sure how a loan would be repaid since zkSNACKs is no longer in business and they shut down their coinjoin coordinator. Blockchain analysis is enforced by individual coordinators if they choose to do so. Currently, the majority of wabisabi coinjoin volume is from non-profit coordinators that don’t blacklist.
member
Activity: 378
Merit: 93
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Want to get your friends on board Wasabi? BTC Sessions created a deep dive tutorial that shows installation, software verification, coordinator setup, receiving, coinjoining, sending, and also connecting your own hardware wallet or full node. Check it out here and share it: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=52pSd3I1nac
legendary
Activity: 2730
Merit: 7065
Wasabi backend currently down due to funding issues... not long after I predict recently that we are going to see Wasabi shutting down their business slowly and gradually.
This is a perfect excuse to have for shutting down Wasabi, nobody can argue with funding issues, since it's obviously not profitable for them.  Roll Eyes
I am sure they will be back. Their blockchain analysis partner could be a lender of last resort if no other handler steps up. After all, it's just a loan that will be returned to them with future coinjoins... The honeypot story continues. But they will be stabbed in the back like everyone else once their handlers have had enough.
legendary
Activity: 2212
Merit: 7064
Wasabi backend currently down due to funding issues... not long after I predict recently that we are going to see Wasabi shutting down their business slowly and gradually.
This is a perfect excuse to have for shutting down Wasabi, nobody can argue with funding issues, since it's obviously not profitable for them.  Roll Eyes

Light the candle (again) please.
member
Activity: 378
Merit: 93
Enable v2transport=1 and mempoolfullrbf=1
I'm neutral, but I agree. There's always a non-zero chance that any software, network, system can and will be exploited.

Explain how to exploit it then.

It may not be proven in practice because there's probably not enough incentives for hackers to attack and exploit those coordinators. But on paper? You can't say that the system is "perfectly/100% not exploitable". That would be dishonest.

Explain how to exploit it then.
legendary
Activity: 2898
Merit: 1823
So, remember people. Wasabi is completely trustless software, as long as you already have private coins, trust another person to join your coinjoin, and deliberately blacklist yourself on every coordinator you connect. Trustlessness on steroids.

OK, if the Wasabi coordinators have those "weaknesses" in their system, what can the developers do to address them?
How does it sound to start being honest with your people? It's OK to admit that it is not completely trustless, people will get it. Neither Samourai, nor Joinmarket were completely trustless. There's always a small risk of getting Sybil attacked; it's just the way coinjoins are constructed. But, no, we have Mr. Absolute Truth here harassing anyone who dares to claim that Wasabi might not cure cancer.


I'm neutral, but I agree. There's always a non-zero chance that any software, network, system can and will be exploited.

Stop that.

Why shouldn't people who want to know about privacy learn that BlackHatCoiner and o_e_l_e_o were hired by a custodial blockchain analysis company? This warning can't be repeated enough after the years they spent camping this topic in order to scam newbie Bitcointalk users out of their coins and data.

OK, if the Wasabi coordinators have those "weaknesses" in their system, what can the developers do to address them?

What "weaknesses" are you talking about?



It may not be proven in practice because there's probably not enough incentives for hackers to attack and exploit those coordinators. But on paper? You can't say that the system is "perfectly/100% not exploitable". That would be dishonest.
member
Activity: 378
Merit: 93
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Stop that.

Why shouldn't people who want to know about privacy learn that BlackHatCoiner and o_e_l_e_o were hired by a custodial blockchain analysis company? This warning can't be repeated enough after the years they spent camping this topic in order to scam newbie Bitcointalk users out of their coins and data.

OK, if the Wasabi coordinators have those "weaknesses" in their system, what can the developers do to address them?

What "weaknesses" are you talking about?

So, remember people. Wasabi is completely trustless software, as long as you already have private coins, trust another person to join your coinjoin, and deliberately blacklist yourself on every coordinator you connect. Trustlessness on steroids.

You said "and" but you meant "or" instead - ANY ONE of these three methods allow the attack target to drain the attacker's wallet, so yes, it's trustlessness on steroids  Cool  Cool  Cool

There's always a small risk of getting Sybil attacked; it's just the way coinjoins are constructed. But, no, we have Mr. Absolute Truth here harassing anyone who dares to claim that Wasabi might not cure cancer.

Okay why can't you prove it then? You keep repeating this claim, but you haven't come up with any methods that would allow you to simultaneously exploit the trustless protocol in 3 different ways:

Your "solutions" don't protect you against a malicious coordinator

Why wouldn't my solutions protect me? Explain how I can still be Sybil attacked if I use the methods I described to you. Start with method 1, explain how the malicious coordinator could defeat it, then go on to method 2, explain how the malicious coordinator could defeat it, then go on to method 3 and explain how a malicious coordinator could defeat it.

Thanks to its design, the WabiSabi protocol is completely invulnerable to a Sybil attack and you've provided absolutely no evidence or argument otherwise.
legendary
Activity: 2534
Merit: 1713
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One of the things that can immediately be noticed when someone such as Kruw comes along are the narcissistic tendencies. I use that word because not only does he never accept he is wrong, he does not even accept the mere possibility that he might be wrong. He has put an overinflated value on anything and everything he posts to the point he simply looks down at everybody else.

How on earth did someone with a serious egotistic condition as him even get that many coinjoins through a coordinator he names after himself?

But, no, we have Mr. Absolute Truth here harassing anyone who dares to claim that Wasabi might not cure cancer.
legendary
Activity: 1512
Merit: 7340
Farewell, Leo
So, remember people. Wasabi is completely trustless software, as long as you already have private coins, trust another person to join your coinjoin, and deliberately blacklist yourself on every coordinator you connect. Trustlessness on steroids.

OK, if the Wasabi coordinators have those "weaknesses" in their system, what can the developers do to address them?
How does it sound to start being honest with your people? It's OK to admit that it is not completely trustless, people will get it. Neither Samourai, nor Joinmarket were completely trustless. There's always a small risk of getting Sybil attacked; it's just the way coinjoins are constructed. But, no, we have Mr. Absolute Truth here harassing anyone who dares to claim that Wasabi might not cure cancer.
legendary
Activity: 2898
Merit: 1823
Having said that, no blockchain analysis representatives have an account here otherwise maybe they could given an answer.

Actually, we have a partner of a blockchain analysis company posting in in this thread: BlackHatCoiner.

BlackHatCoiner and o_e_l_e_o were both hired by the 'Mixtum" blockchain analysis company to get Bitcointalk users to deposit their BTC into their custodial spy network:


Stop that. They were merely challenging your system through a debate. It would be nice if you addressed the debate directly, rather than than replying with Ad Hominem attacks that attempt to discredit the debater even though their questions have some validity. Those challenges, if addressed, might also help improve Wasabi coordinator CoinJoins.

OK, if the Wasabi coordinators have those "weaknesses" in their system, what can the developers do to address them?

¯\_(ツ)_/¯
legendary
Activity: 2534
Merit: 1713
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If you ask yourself honestly there is no doubt you will come to the same conclusion as most others on a specific aspect of your posting habits. There is nothing to achieve by periodically mentioning any member (especially one that was highly respected by the vast majority) that is not going to return to defend themselves against any allegation that you (or anybody else) is going to throw in their direction.

I have read the posts from BlackHatCoiner and it is clear he is more than capable of engaging with you (but surely you can leave other names out of your vendetta).

Actually, we have a partner of a blockchain analysis company posting in in this thread: BlackHatCoiner.

BlackHatCoiner and o_e_l_e_o were both hired by the 'Mixtum" blockchain analysis company to get Bitcointalk users to deposit their BTC into their custodial spy network:

Quote from: Mixtum
[3. Quality scoring of incoming transactions.
member
Activity: 378
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So what do I do?  Do I have to get myself banned 10 times, which is also a big waste of time on my end particularly if time is a very important resource and I am a Target, while trying to find out if the Attacker is quitting due to Mining Fee burns?

I explained 3 different methods to detect a Sybil attacker, you don't have to get yourself banned:

My points proved conclusively that coordinators are trustless. You can even use all 3 anti Sybil methods together at once, you don't have to rely on just one:

- First, register your private coin to the coordinator. If it's accepted, then there's no Sybil attack.
- Second, ask your friend to register a coin to the same round. If it's accepted, then you've confirmed for a second time that there's no Sybil attack.
- Third, just to be absolutely sure, back out of the round during signing to check to see if the transaction was built to target you. If the transaction is created, you've confirmed for a third time that there's no Sybil attack.

If somebody is so keen on trying to attack a Target, then may be safe to assume the Target is likely very important and therefore the Funding could be huge.  And I imagine having a Million Dollars funding to spend on a Decoy Coordinator burning Mining Fees in an attempt of the successful Attack is not too extraordinary either.

Imagine the attacker wasting a million dollars in mining fees to set up a decoy only to be immediately detected with methods 1 or 2  Grin Grin Grin
legendary
Activity: 882
Merit: 1873
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Honest coordinators issue temporary bans to non-signer inputs as a DoS protection measure, so a convincing Sybil attacker would have to do the same.
So what do I do?  Do I have to get myself banned 10 times, which is also a big waste of time on my end particularly if time is a very important resource and I am a Target, while trying to find out if the Attacker is quitting due to Mining Fee burns?

If somebody is so keen on trying to attack a Target, then may be safe to assume the Target is likely very important and therefore the Funding could be huge.  And I imagine having a Million Dollars funding to spend on a Decoy Coordinator burning Mining Fees in an attempt of the successful Attack is not too extraordinary either.
member
Activity: 378
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Step 1: Find a coordinator.
Step 2: Check if he is a Sybil attacker by DoS-ing him.
Step 3: Have your coins blacklisted in that coordinator.
Step 4: Repeat step 1 until there are no coordinators left.

Lol!  Grin

I already gave you all the steps, you never responded to them, remember?

My points proved conclusively that coordinators are trustless. You can even use all 3 anti Sybil methods together at once, you don't have to rely on just one:

- First, register your private coin to the coordinator. If it's accepted, then there's no Sybil attack.
- Second, ask your friend to register a coin to the same round. If it's accepted, then you've confirmed for a second time that there's no Sybil attack.
- Third, just to be absolutely sure, back out of the round during signing to check to see if the transaction was built to target you. If the transaction is created, you've confirmed for a third time that there's no Sybil attack.
legendary
Activity: 1512
Merit: 7340
Farewell, Leo
Step 1: Find a coordinator.
Step 2: Check if he is a Sybil attacker by DDoS-ing him.
Step 3: Have your coins blacklisted in that coordinator.
Step 4: Repeat step 1 until there are no coordinators left.

Lol!  Grin
member
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How does the victim get to do that indefinitely when the coordinator is supposed to ban him after refusing to sign and disrupt the round? What prevents the attacker coordinator to simply mark these inputs as blacklisted, with DoS protection measure as an excuse?

Then you confirmed with 100% certainty that the coordinator was not trying to target you with a Sybil attack since they won't allow you to participate at all.
legendary
Activity: 1512
Merit: 7340
Farewell, Leo
It is needless to mention that all those "precautions" and "solutions" have to be made manually. The client can only tell you if your coins are refused, which gives no insights whatsoever of whether you're being Sybil attacked or not. In other words, it is outside the skill set of the overwhelming majority of users who just want some privacy.

This costs the target victim nothing, and they can repeat it as many times as they want.
How does the victim get to do that indefinitely when the coordinator is supposed to ban him after refusing to sign and disrupt the round? What prevents the attacker coordinator from simply marking these inputs as blacklisted, with DoS protection measure as an excuse?
member
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What if the Transaction is still created even if I am a target and am backing out?

Then you have the opportunity to burn the Sybil attacker's funds in mining fees. Honest coordinators issue temporary bans to non-signer inputs as a DoS protection measure, so a convincing Sybil attacker would have to do the same. During this ban time, the attacker would have to continue to pay mining fees to remix some portion of the UTXOs that the target originally observed in the transaction as well as their ancestors and descendants. The more convincing the attacker tries to be, the more mining fees they have to pay. This costs the target victim nothing, and they can repeat it as many times as they want.
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