CryptoNote / Monero et al
CryptoNote's one-time ring signature as a way of obfuscating who is the payer (the spender), is optional and can only be used when there are other payees who have the inputs amounts. In other words, it can't do any obfuscation for you on spending unless there are other coins that have the same balance as yours.
That very infrequent opportunity for use is coupled with constant use of elliptical curve cryptography which is known to be broken under quantum computing, as well is suspect to broken by the NSA or could be broken since it is number theoretic public key cryptography.
This is actually pretty easy to solve and CryptoNote already implements it: every transaction is broken up. There will always be outputs in the blockchain matching the broken-down components. Unlike CoinJoin, this is done without any participation from anyone else. The other matching amounts are not being spent at the same time; in fact they can be used as many times as needed as an ambiguity factor without actually being spent. This means the opportunity to use ring signatures isn't infrequent at all -- you can send any amount you want and it will be appropriately matched and mixed. (See section 4.5 in the white paper.)
You haven't addressed my point that eliminates the ability to prune the block chain, because you will never know which outputs have been spent.
Automatically (is this enforced or optional per wallet?) breaking the transaction outputs into constant units, e.g. 1 coin, 0.5 coin, 0.25 coin etc, will radically bloat the block chain. The ring signatures are going to be huge if you need to obfuscate among say for example 256 payers (1/256 probability of being non-anonymous) each for several inputs, e.g. for 1.76 MRO spend 1 MRO, 0.5 MRO, 0.25 MRO, 0.01 MRO, as well as payee addresses for each of those fractional amounts.
And it won't solve the problem unless the smallest of those enforced fractional amounts match up with the fractional remainder of your transaction, which implies radical block chain bloat.
All of that waste, and still if your IP is not obfuscated you lose anonymity.
Whereas, if your IP address is obfuscated, then you don't need all that waste above (and don't incur the risk of relying on elliptical signatures being compromised
ANY TIME IN THE FUTURE DECADES breaking your historic anonymity on the block chain).
And with IP address obfuscation your anonymity is assured regardless what happens on the block chain tracing.
However it might still be an improvement to enforce one-time ring signatures only when merging balances, i.e. multiple inputs to a transaction. But the issue of partitioning transactions to fixed fractional amounts and block chain bloat has to be weighed.
If you think that bloating the block chain is irrelevant then I remind you that two Bitcoin pools control more than 50% of the network, so if the government takes over these pools (even insidiously), they can defeat you (in numerous ways, e.g. they can help correlate your IP address by controlling the destination and source of your transaction sends and mining awards respectively).
It already takes hours to days to download the Bitcoin block chain, and you are proposing to increase that by orders-of-magnitude.