The fat middle is now accepting that the surveillance is necessary to fight terrorism and Snowden should not have given away 'our' secrets. So they will also probably accept that steps to keep terrorists from making and end-run around the system are also necessary. Only about 5% of people are aware of what cryptography actually is anyway, and only about 15% even have the native intellect to do so if they tried. My estimates.
My opinion:
The fear of T is most probably only a false fear to maximize control over the society through surveillance.
But even If the threat of T is real, the threatened state must solve the cause of T instead of fighting it. The only solution to conflicts are understanding and patience, not fear and war. But peace is less profitable than war and fear, so the latter solution wins.
I think that the biggest problem our leadership (in the US) has with terrorism is that there is not enough for them to achieve their goals. They practically have to strap dummy vests on borderline retard kids themselves in order to catch any 'terrorists' and get a good scare going among the plebs in these lean times.
A vastly bigger threat of harm to me is corruption and mis-management of my tax dollars, and that is where surveillance is of genuine value. Here's the policy I would put in place if I had my way:
- Anyone who wishes to work in the government at a management or higher level submits to surveillance. Those who don't wish to submit are free to resign. They will receive full pensions as promised...unless 'austerity' intervenes...
- The records accumulated since the spying went into place are preened of all but government official's data and one degree of linkage.
- The entire ball of wax is open-sourced for analysis by interested taxpayers.
I would also not only fully pardon Manning and Snowden and the rest of the whistleblowers but ask them to become high ranking officials in an honest and honorable government.
Can judicial decisions be made in secret, and be Constitutional?
I think not, since the implication is "What we are doing is Constitutional....trust us on that...."
Behavior that was not Constitutional could occur in such "secret judiciary" by several means:
1. Error.
2. Good intent, bad or ridiculous interpretation.
3. Corruption.
4. Willful and/or intentional Constitutional disregard to achieve political, military or business objectives.
A second issue is the Constitutionality of the handling of datasets which exist as the result of the secret judicial decisions. These, after being created by way of any of the means above cited, could be used in non Constitutional means by at least the four methods above mentioned.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/us/in-secret-court-vastly-broadens-powers-of-nsa.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&pagewanted=all&_r=1& Unlike the Supreme Court, the FISA court hears from only one side in the case — the government — and its findings are almost never made public. A Court of Review is empaneled to hear appeals, but that is known to have happened only a handful of times in the court’s history, and no case has ever been taken to the Supreme Court. In fact, it is not clear in all circumstances whether Internet and phone companies that are turning over the reams of data even have the right to appear before the FISA court.
Created by Congress in 1978 as a check against wiretapping abuses by the government, the court meets in a secure, nondescript room in the federal courthouse in Washington. All of the current 11 judges, who serve seven-year terms, were appointed to the special court by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., and 10 of them were nominated to the bench by Republican presidents. Most hail from districts outside the capital and come in rotating shifts to hear surveillance applications; a single judge signs most surveillance orders, which totaled nearly 1,800 last year. None of the requests from the intelligence agencies was denied, according to the court.
Beyond broader legal rulings, the judges have had to resolve questions about newer types of technology, like video conferencing, and how and when the government can get access to them, the officials said.
The judges have also had to intervene repeatedly when private Internet and phone companies, which provide much of the data to the N.S.A., have raised concerns that the government is overreaching in its demands for records or when the government itself reports that it has inadvertently collected more data than was authorized, the officials said. In such cases, the court has repeatedly ordered the N.S.A. to destroy the Internet or phone data that was improperly collected, the officials said.
The officials said one central concept connects a number of the court’s opinions. The judges have concluded that the mere collection of enormous volumes of “metadata” — facts like the time of phone calls and the numbers dialed, but not the content of conversations — does not violate the Fourth Amendment, as long as the government establishes a valid reason under national security regulations before taking the next step of actually examining the contents of an American’s communications.
This concept is rooted partly in the “special needs” provision the court has embraced. “The basic idea is that it’s O.K. to create this huge pond of data,” a third official said, “but you have to establish a reason to stick your pole in the water and start fishing.”
Under the new procedures passed by Congress in 2008 in the FISA Amendments Act, even the collection of metadata must be considered “relevant” to a terrorism investigation or other intelligence activities.
The court has indicated that while individual pieces of data may not appear “relevant” to a terrorism investigation, the total picture that the bits of data create may in fact be relevant, according to the officials with knowledge of the decisions.