Author

Topic: [IOTA] Крипто-токен для "интернета вещей" (Internet-of-Things) - page 105. (Read 227004 times)

legendary
Activity: 2142
Merit: 1010
Newbie
до него не достучишься, может ты сам у него спросишь в чем проблема? и как быть. Тем более в английском не силен

Нет смысла спрашивать пока не предоставлен сид, который дает адрес с ненулевым балансом.
member
Activity: 129
Merit: 10
Come-from-Beyond, помоги плиз разобраться. Ввожу сид в кошелек, жму receive, но в итоге - баланс ноль. Как так? Проверил сид здесь http://188.138.57.93/oldaddressgenerator.html - все верно.

Мой адресс - FDTOXHTCMNLXZE9UCUZ9YCMPFRDXSSDSPXSRCGFLWZAXWHVH9CXKJUZACGOLNJUIYJFUEINEQKJAOI9 TC   206 160 593 801

Тебе надо писать челобитную Дэвиду. Крипт, расскажи как это делается.
до него не достучишься, может ты сам у него спросишь в чем проблема? и как быть. Тем более в английском не силен
legendary
Activity: 2142
Merit: 1010
Newbie
Grin Grin   ты на ICO собирал деньги, ты и рассказывай   Grin Grin

Я не собирал деньги на ICO. Ты создал тему для русскоязычных - ты и рассказывай.
legendary
Activity: 1540
Merit: 1096
расскажи как это делается.
Grin Grin   ты на ICO собирал деньги, ты и рассказывай   Grin Grin
legendary
Activity: 2142
Merit: 1010
Newbie
Come-from-Beyond, помоги плиз разобраться. Ввожу сид в кошелек, жму receive, но в итоге - баланс ноль. Как так? Проверил сид здесь http://188.138.57.93/oldaddressgenerator.html - все верно.

Мой адресс - FDTOXHTCMNLXZE9UCUZ9YCMPFRDXSSDSPXSRCGFLWZAXWHVH9CXKJUZACGOLNJUIYJFUEINEQKJAOI9 TC   206 160 593 801

Тебе надо писать челобитную Дэвиду. Крипт, расскажи как это делается.
full member
Activity: 204
Merit: 100
Come-from-Beyond, помоги плиз разобраться. Ввожу сид в кошелек, жму receive, но в итоге - баланс ноль. Как так? Проверил сид здесь http://188.138.57.93/oldaddressgenerator.html - все верно.

Мой адресс - FDTOXHTCMNLXZE9UCUZ9YCMPFRDXSSDSPXSRCGFLWZAXWHVH9CXKJUZACGOLNJUIYJFUEINEQKJAOI9 TC   206 160 593 801
legendary
Activity: 1540
Merit: 1096
Добрый день!
Где то в сентябре-октябре 2016 было
1.3 млрд. йоты.
Сколько это на современные йоты?
1.3Gi
ёты современны с 16.04.2016

Adjusted snapshot (values were multiplied by 2'779'531):
Code:
9BEGGWPPO9REJOAKRHITKTEPUIQMOQHUTOSYEZFTJQSYTY9OLAGEQBHPAPKBZXYPV99LMMSERXZYYAUJJ	31 072 310 340 256
9DHZBCWMJOLRLOVOWCIT9HBPZURHZPZJQCDASKTVEZLSFVOMZDPYMJGLEBBWNCVVQWRRNRWTBOW9FYTIP 1 849 997 463 449
9EIBEXIIZSPXRGGCATECHPLNYXKHTAUOGILUBMLNXGFSDRRGWODVSTYQVQGXYZLXZGBVLSUGKYJKWMHMN 111 181 240 000
9ESVVEMS9DRFSOQDYHHVERWSAXVDBPNBYWPPYMDNSXEMSYZQCEBCRNKFJVHDQS9BDQSCNVQEITYLVJYZO 7 274 455 .....
legendary
Activity: 2156
Merit: 1132
Добрый день!
Где то в сентябре-октябре 2016 было
1.3 млрд. йоты.
Сколько это на современные йоты?
legendary
Activity: 2142
Merit: 1010
Newbie
Сейчас админ биржи, Паоло, не нашёл ничего лучше, как просто понадеяться, что их ёто-выплаты будут подтверждаться за 24 часа (до этого он надеялся, что за 12):
Quote
Paolo [6:53 PM]  
We are not reusing any input for 12 hours at least. Indeed we could change to 24 hours
Paolo [7:22 PM]  
done
24 hours should be enough I think
так он думает...

Киселев беспощаден, теперь он поразил мозговые центры, отвечающие за перевод с английского...
legendary
Activity: 1050
Merit: 1002
Newbie
... А так что там по моему вопросу с расчетом йот? 1 монета - 1 мегайота, 1024 монет - 1 гигайота?

1 мегайёта = 1,000,000 йётт
1 гигайёта = 1,000,000,000 йётт
1 терайёта = 1,000,000,000,000 йётт

А почему 1 гигаёта не 1024 мегаёты? Куда делись остальные 24? Ушли девелоперам?

ушли к тебе на обед. Wink
legendary
Activity: 2142
Merit: 1010
Newbie
... А так что там по моему вопросу с расчетом йот? 1 монета - 1 мегайота, 1024 монет - 1 гигайота?

1 мегайёта = 1,000,000 йётт
1 гигайёта = 1,000,000,000 йётт
1 терайёта = 1,000,000,000,000 йётт

А почему 1 гигаёта не 1024 мегаёты? Куда делись остальные 24? Ушли девелоперам?
legendary
Activity: 1050
Merit: 1002
Newbie
... А так что там по моему вопросу с расчетом йот? 1 монета - 1 мегайота, 1024 монет - 1 гигайота?

1 мегайёта = 1,000,000 йётт
1 гигайёта = 1,000,000,000 йётт
1 терайёта = 1,000,000,000,000 йётт
legendary
Activity: 1540
Merit: 1096
продолжение обсуждения из #tanglemath
Code:
Micah Zoltu [2017.06.14 10:06 PM]  
It seems that the Iota equilibrium requires the majority of participants behaving in a way that is "good for the network" rather than in a way that is purely selfish.  I did not believe that there would be a large enough share of non-selfish individuals to prevent selfish individuals from taking over the network while it seemed like others believe that being selfish was likely too hard for most people to bother.
My primary argument was that there exists a parent selection strategy that is as-good or better than the recommended parent selection strategy but hurts the network.  Because there is no selfish incentive to use the recommended strategy over this strategy, over time participants will tend towards the competing strategy, which will continually degrade network health to the point where those participating in the selfish strategy can take over the network and change the effective rules.
In particular, I believe the equilibrium is around large participants charging "transaction" fees to smaller participants for inclusion.
Thinking on it even more over the past few days, I'm concerned that this selfish strategy will actually reach the point where confirmation isn't possible because there are too many isolated sub-tangles that aren't merging regularly.
Sunny Aggarwal  [10:15 PM]  Yes.  Precisely.  @micah.zoltu’s point is exactly what I was trying to get at as well.  Those orphaned subtangles will only be able to merge back into the main tangle by paying computationally powerful actors to confirm them.
Sunny Aggarwal  [10:28 PM]  Furthermore, this is exacerbated by the fact that the selfish parent selection strategy doesn’t need to be dominant in the network overall.  It just has to be dominant amongst active users of the network at any given moment.
Chat-for-Ban [10:39 PM]  Give me example of selfish strategy.
Micah Zoltu [10:39 PM]  The selfish strategy I believe is to never choose a parent that isn't something you personally care about. There is no selfish incentive that I have seen to choose anything other than your own transaction as your parent.
Chat-for-Ban [10:41 PM]  We assume that 67% of _nodes_ stick to one of the good strategies
Micah Zoltu [10:41 PM]  :point_up: This is what I believe is hugely dangerous.
That requires 67% of participants (by _computing power_ - since one can simulate a node with computing power) to not be self interested and instead be altruistic participants to some degree.
Chat-for-Ban [10:44 PM]  This {to simulate a node with computing power} is a bold claim for IoT, are you familiar with LoRa? {mesh https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LPWAN}  
Chat-for-Ban [10:52 PM]  My words can be narrowed down to this phrase: _Omnipresence can't be achieved easily_
Micah Zoltu [10:53 PM]  I don't believe omnipresence is necessary for what I described above?
Chat-for-Ban [10:53 PM]  A lot of meshnets will go via classical internet, we probably even be unable to distinguish where IoT ends and classical Internet starts
I believe it's necessary because of mesh-like nature of the IOTA network. How would the network react to your attack in slow-motion?
...
Micah Zoltu [11:06 PM]  Unless you can prevent me from putting my supercomputer on the network, you can't prevent me from spoofing nodes.
Chat-for-Ban [11:06 PM]  At this point bandwidth starts playing role. I don't even need to, you can't connect to most of nodes
Chat-for-Ban [11:11 PM]  how can you spoof some node? you need to go to some spot on the earth and place your radiotransmitter, there are no wires going to some superhub
Micah Zoltu [11:12 PM]  Sure, I go to some spot on earth drop down a radio transmitter and a supercomputer.  I tell all my neighbors, "I'm connected to a billion neighbors behind me." No node can disprove that I am not actually connected to a billion neighbors.
Chat-for-Ban [11:12 PM]  You cannot do it physically. Because of bandwidth restrictions.
Micah Zoltu [11:13 PM]  So that means the network doesn't have enough bandwidth to actually support the network. A mesh network needs enough bandwidth to route everything.
Sunny Aggarwal  [11:33 PM]  Sure so any transactions that happen within that 1000-node cluster are “safe”.  But anything coming in from outside that cluster (through the 10 gateway nodes) are susceptible to the supercomputer
Chat-for-Ban [11:34 PM]  alright, now we need @micah.zoltu to agree with you and we will move to another attack scenario where supercomputer attacks other clusters
Micah Zoltu [11:34 PM]  agree with that statement
Chat-for-Ban [11:35 PM]  great, I was thinking you were going to attack transactions inside the cluster, this is what caused the misunderstanding, it seems.  so, 1000 nodes, 10 nodes on the edge, how would you attack transactions generated by other clusters?
Micah Zoltu [11:36 PM]  You don't attack transactions, you just run a supercomputer that is generating > 34% transactions.
Chat-for-Ban [11:40 PM]  you connected to 10 edge nodes and push a lot of txs?
Micah Zoltu [11:40 PM]  Yeah.
Chat-for-Ban [11:41 PM]  but these 10 nodes can't push your txs with the same rate. only 10% of your txs will be pushed thru
Micah Zoltu [11:41 PM]  That means that those 10 nodes can't support connecting to the network unless their sub-mesh makes up the majority of the network.
That 1000-node mesh network with 10 edges must be able to handle traffic from the rest of the network, which is very likely bigger than them. They need to be able to connect to the larger network as a whole.  They can't assume that their mesh is the largest part of the network.
Chat-for-Ban [11:49 PM]  you can connect to some part of cluster, start spamming, and bringing _several_ nodes down
Micah Zoltu [11:50 PM]  If they can't handle traffic from the global network, they aren't actually part of the network. Either your cluster can handle the traffic of the global network via its 10 edges or it can't.  If it can't, then it isn't part of the global Iota tangle and doesn't matter.  Its effectively running a fork of the network and we don't care about it. If it can keep up via those 10 edges then it is susceptible to supercomputer node simulation via those edges.
Micah Zoltu [2017.06.14 11:52 PM]  <-- https://iotatangle.slack.com/archives/C3V610ULS/p1497473569196293
* Isolated cluster of 1000 mesh nodes, 10 of which are edge nodes.
* Edge nodes connect to global Iota network over something like IP (or similar high bandwidth centralized route that anyone can get on).
* Cluster can handle bandwidth requirements of the global network via those edge nodes. <-- Either your cluster can handle the traffic of the global network via its 10 edges or it can't.  If it can't, then it isn't part of the global Iota tangle and doesn't matter.  Its effectively running a fork of the network and we don't care about it.
If it can keep up via those 10 edges then it is susceptible to supercomputer node simulation via those edges.
Sunny Aggarwal  [11:53 PM]  And the thing is, this itself in a way is the exact attack we were suggesting.  If the supercomputer can force a mesh into being isolated from the tangle, it can then start charging fees in order to allow it to communicate with the rest of the larger network
Chat-for-Ban [11:57 PM]  Guys, I need your both to say only AGREE or DISAGREE to https://iotatangle.slack.com/archives/C3V610ULS/p1497473775265357 :
  "Your attack works if our cluster can't cover 90% of the earth. Your attack does NOT work if our cluster can cover 90% of the reath." Agree?
Micah Zoltu [12:46 AM]  I have no intention of spending my time thinking about how Iota will function in the face of Unicorns. Either you can argue that Unicorns are real and if successful I will consider it, or we can just end the conversation, or we can discuss Iota in a world without unicorns.
Micah Zoltu [12:51 AM]  @Chat-for-Ban You are making the following logical fallacy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existential_fallacy
Micah Zoltu [12:51 AM]  @Chat-for-Ban You are making the following logical fallacy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existential_fallacy
Chat-for-Ban [12:52 AM]  @sunnya97 Do you remember I mentioned that we use manual tethering? The purpose of that tethering (instead of peer autodiscovery) was to get the same properties as IoT meshnets get
Micah Zoltu [12:54 AM]  What you are proposing is a global web of trust. "I will only peer with people I trust." The problem is, it only takes _one_ break in the entire global web of trust chain to undermine the trust network. All I need to do is get one other "edge" node to trust me and I can now simulate an entire network.
Chat-for-Ban [12:55 AM]  @sunnya97 apply the supercomputer attack on it, please. In mind of coz, not in reality. Will your attack be successful?
Sunny Aggarwal  [12:56 AM]  Essentially this is close to a permissioned system then.
David S?nsteb? [12:56 AM]  Can either of you just prove your attacks and collect major bug bounties? alternatively shut the fuck up? It's pretty simple; if you think you got an attack vector, then prove it
Micah Zoltu [2017.06.14 1:05 AM]  The whitepaper describes a _particular_ parent selection strategy and then defends a number of attacks based on that assumption.  I started the argument by asserting that the parent selection strategy would not be the dominant one because there are more selfish parent selection strategies available.
Kamal Mokeddem [1:07 AM]  I'm looking at how you secure the network against a denial of service attack. What prevents someone from only selecting their own tips and spamming the network with transactions such that the honest tips are orphaned?
Fahad Sheikh [1:18 AM]  @david @Chat-for-Ban there is no point publishing a white paper if it is not going to be defended. Asking for a physical manifestation is not a logical defense. Which is why many devs complain that IOTA dev just go hostile but don't give a proper argument in defense.
Dominik Schiener [1:40 AM]  if given the resources, who would feel comfortable in coming up with the attack? @micah.zoltu @sunnya97
Micah Zoltu [1:45 AM]  @dom I have way too many projects on my plate.. Though, the definition of the "attack" is simply: "every node selects its own transactions as parents only."
Alon Elmaliah [1:50 AM]  that's a dead-lock by design
Micah Zoltu [1:50 AM]  @alon.elmaliah Yeah, exactly.  But that is where things end up if actors behave selfishly. Avoiding the deadlock requires a significant amount of network resources (hashpower) to behave altruistically.
Micah Zoltu [2:01 AM]  If IOTA depends on people acting non-selfishly "for the greater good" then most of my arguments go away. I do not think that is a healthy assumption in a pseudoanonymous world though.
Micah Zoltu [2:15 AM]  TL;DR of the natural death of the network:
* Selfish client spams network with transactions.  These transactions have parents that are transactions this actor wants promoted.  They never promote anything that doesn't benefit them.
* Altruistic actors will randomly select parents (or MCMC or whatever).
* Given enough selfish actors, you end up with a situation where there are a bunch of heavy weight sub-tangles (which matters for confirmation) that include almost nothing else except the selfish actor's own transactions (and transactions where someone else sends them something).
* The altruistic actors are constantly trying to merge sub-tangles but they don't have enough weight to make it stick (confirm).
David S?nsteb? [2:24 AM]  I don't think you guys quite grasp the full vision of IOTA. IOTA enables streams of transactions (due to no fees). IOTA came about after considering the hardware environment, not the other way around IOTA exist soley due to hardware.
David S?nsteb? [2:38 AM]  Micah: if I offer you 10K to demontrate this, will you do it tomorrow? <-- https://iotatangle.slack.com/archives/C3V610ULS/p1497483482510115
Micah Zoltu [2:38 AM]  @david As I have said many times, I am way too busy to go and engineer a solution to your problem.  I came here trying to be helpful, not to actively attack your network. If I am going to engineer something it will be an actual attack against the network because that is worth way more than $10k.
David S?nsteb? [2:39 AM]  @micah.zoltu so essentially 10K is 'nothing to you', you want to be a malevolent actor and earn more? Ok, I am looking forward to it now that you admitted you're looking for a bigger pay out
Serguei Popov [2:47 AM] re:"By selecting your own transactions as parents, you increase the chances ..." - I doubt that "selecting your own transactions as parents" is a good strategy even for a "completely selfish" (whatever it means) node. Because (1) other selfish nodes won't reference your transactions because they owe nothing to you; (2) "honest" nodes won't reference your transactions because the random walk is very unlikely to choose them (see the "lazy tips" on figure 6 in the whitepaper). Therefore, if your goal is to get your transaction confirmed by the network, you should better do something that would cause at least the honest nodes to reference it. Because you'll reference tx's that are deep inside the tangle, and the RandomWalks's transition probabilities are chosen in such a way that it is extremely unlikely that the walker jumps from "deep inside" directly to a tip.
re:"The altruistic actors are constantly trying to merge sub-tangles but they don't have enough weight to make it stick (confirm)." - "No! What will happen, is that the "altruistic" actors will build "their" subtangle, and all these "selfish" guys will selfishly fall to limbo.
Serguei Popov [2:48 AM]  Ah, and a concluding remark. Of course, it would be nice to have a proof that iota is secure. Believe me, I would really like to be able to obtain it. But I couldn't. Well, sometimes things get too complicated. So, all I have for now is my Markov chains' intuition, about which I humbly think it deserves some respect. Besides, do you realise that the entire modern public-key cryptography relies on unproven assumptions?! Should we stop using it until they prove that P?NP?"
Serguei Popov [2:50 AM] re:Chat-for-Ban's "We assume that 67% of nodes stick to one of the good strategies." - Don't think this assumption is necessary (I don't believe in "magic numbers"). Rather, the assumption is that "a good proportion of nodes follows a 'canonical' strategy", which is a perfectly reasonable assumption in the IoT environment, at least in the beginning.
re: "I fear that everyone using a selfish strategy will result in the network falling apart. A tragedy of the commons." - At this point, I feel that some people try to apply intuition from Game Theory 101 to our situation, when quite a lot of (approximately) independent actors interact. Yes, it is true that, in general, if a system has unique stable state, it eventually gets there, and there remains. However, the time until it happens can be really large; things of this kinds are called metastability in the literature. Let us maybe consider a simple toy model. Assume that there are 100 nodes whose states can be 0 or 1; initially, there are 37 nodes in state 1, and 63 nodes in state 0. Then, at each (discrete) moment of time each node randomly chooses 50 other nodes, and (1) if at least one of these nodes is in state 1, then the state of our node will be 1 with probability 0.8 and 0 with probability 0.2, independently of the others; (2) if all these nodes are in state 0, then our node also becomes 0. This is an example of a metastable situation. The only stable state is obviously "all zeros". Eventually, it will be reached (after all, the state space of the system is finite). However, the time until it happens will be really huge. I'm too lazy to do the calculations, but I'm quite sure it will be much bigger than the lifetime of the Universe... Please, think about this example. That "slow heat-death" can be really slow  :slightly_smiling_face:
Micah Zoltu [2:51 AM]  You are asserting that random selection _is_ the selfish strategy.  Based on the whitepaper ("honest" nodes randomly choose n transactions from some time-window in the past and then walk randomly until they reach a tip.  Then the tips of the 2 "longest" paths are selected as parents.) I am unconvinced of this assertion and I would really like to focus on that. / Why honest nodes won't select my selfish transactions?
Serguei Popov [2:58 AM]  because we're assuming that you cannot outperform all the others in the number of tx's (this answers why they won't be chosen as a starting point of the walk. Or did you mean smth else?)
Micah Zoltu [2:59 AM]  Why do I need to outperform all others in number of transactions to be selected? Remember, we are talking about parent selection, not confirmation.
Serguei Popov [3:01 AM]  Are we talking about the selection of the starting point for the walk? Or its final point?
Micah Zoltu [3:11 AM]  So... with "longest-path-to-tip" walker pathing algorithm the insertion gets very expensive after a while. Anyway, I'm willing to glaze over the fact that pathfinding longest-path is hard and accept it since I don't think it matters. If path selection is longest-path, the selfish miner simply generates really long paths to optimize for inclusion by others.
Serguei Popov [3:12 AM]  re:"with "longest-path-to-tip" walker pathing algorithm" - No, it is not. It is the one described in the paper, with transition probabilities calculated using the cumulative weights (= sum of weights of the tx's that approve the given one, directly or indirectly).
Serguei Popov [3:16 AM]  Please, do listen to me. The algorithm is not "select the longest path". I'm just claiming that in "normal" situation it will select a long path (not necessarily the longest one). However, if you try to game it by producing a "long-path-of-yours", you'll fail.
Micah Zoltu [3:42 AM]  So.. We have a bucket of all transactions in the tangle.  Parent selection is based on a subset of that set, I'm calling this "eligible population".  You indicated that eligible population is based on height (trunk distance from genesis). So how the code decides where (at which tx) to place the walkers for parent selection process?
Alon Elmaliah [3:51 AM]  currently each tx has a given height. you can select the starting point based on height - which height is given by the user (using depth param)
Alon Elmaliah [3:52 AM]  height == max_trusted_height-depth.   you can set any address to give you a sense of height. you can also give a specific tx to start walking from.
Micah Zoltu [3:55 AM]  If you _have_ a selection algorithm, then that selection algorithm is what a selfish participant wants to target.

Chat-for-Ban [11:18 AM]  I'm not going to answer @micah.zoltu 's questions, now he is an example of my attitude towards those who don't have courage to admit when they lose a dispute.
Chat-for-Ban [8:10 PM]  @micah.zoltu you were caught on evading accepting losing in a dispute. At this point I treat you as a troll. Anything you want to tell as the last word before I ban you? I can wait for 5 mins.


Chat-for-Ban [11:49 AM]  System is protected via voting. Voting is shielded against Sybil attacks with help of resource-testing measures (done during attaching to tangle). If you imagine an attack as a swinging sword then network topology is the water. To swing with a sword being in the water you need much more strength to deliver the same blow.
As it was said numerous times: unlike other coins, in IOTA users don't do PoW all the time, so to do 34% attack you need to outpace only hashrate of active users. IoT environment increases leverage of the protection thus transforming 34% to 3400%.
Serguei Popov [3:21 PM]  re:"selfish is to get fast confirmation, so ppl will go to use that selfish client" - What he proposed so far as "selfish strategies" would actually lead to slower confirmation times for the one who uses them, not faster. The basic idea is: if you want to be accepted by others, do what they expect you to do. You know there is a complicated probability distribution on the set of tips, according to which the "honest" nodes choose their tips to reference. This probability distribution is effectively concentrated on "good tips", but there seem to be no way to discover which tips are (slightly) better other than running the MCRW many times. However, if a node is so selfish that he wants to really reference the tips whose weight (according to that distribution) is maximized, he would need to run MCRW really many times, and even then the gain would be marginal. However, running MCRW many times requires time/resources; after you spend some time on it, the state of the tangle will already change, so you'll have to start anew. In a way, it's like playing blitz in chess: if you want to win, you don't have to always play best moves; you need to play (reasonably) good moves, but fast ...

TL;DR:
Micah Zoltu утверждает, что Ёто-whitepaper неполноценна:
Chat-for-Ban [2017.08.28 10:33 PM] IOTA should not be confused with Tangle concept. The both use different security assumptions
Quote
Chat-for-Ban [10:14 PM] IOTA uses  network-bound PoW
N.E.T.W.O.R.K-bound, because radiospectrum is limited
Chat-for-Ban [10:20 PM]
IOTA is unattackable as long as bandwidth (traffic between nodes = radio spectrum) is ~100% consumed
if only 10% of bandwidth is consumed it's not hard to attack
luckily, bandwidth is consumed 100% most of time
Chat-for-Ban [10:25 PM] attacker can't have so much bandwidth coz he is not omnipresent
you need _physical_ omnipresence to conduct a successful attack
Chat-for-Ban [10:31 PM] Botnet can do an attack if it got 1/3 of the radiospectrum in that area

см. также: https://forum.helloiota.com/627/CfB-discusses-advanced-future-IOTA-stuff-on-tanglemath (26.10.17)


+++++++++
EDIT: Вопросы

Quote from: Symphonic_Rainboom link=https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/6h2jut/have_ethereum_devs_considered_tangle_dag_instead/divgwfs/?context=3
From the whitepaper:
Quote
From the above discussion it is important to observe that, for the system to be secure, it should be true that λw > µ (otherwise, the estimate (14) would be useless); i.e., the input flow of “honest” transactions should be large enough compared to the attacker’s computational power.
What this means to me logically is that in IOTA, every user is a miner, and they are only mining when they are sending transactions. A 51% double-spending attack then becomes as simple as an attacker with sophisticated hardware having more computing power than normal users with general purpose hardware (and not all of the normal users, only the ones who are currently online and making transactions).

Quote from: Daniel_Larimer link=https://files.slack.com/files-pri/T1MAUQMD4-F6W96HSF6/download/image.png

Assume two devices have a subset of all transactions
Thus a subset of unspent output
Two new conflicting transactions are generating and sent to two different devices
These devices attempt to build off of these different transactions
End result is that unless you have the complete tangle you can never be sure you have current state.
Peers cannot confirm other transactions withous access to the history of those transactions.
Thus IOTA does nothing for sharding network load.

------------------
As far as I understand IOTA makes each transaction a block that refers to two prior transactions and adds proof of work to each transaction. The requirement of proof of work is a proof that it doesen't scale infinitely because the difficulty of the work will have to rise to prevent spam.

Quote
Rutger van Haasteren [2017.09.02 7:41 AM] I'm mulling over the subject over IOTA security, and how it is based on a combination of the PoW, the tip selection process, and the mutual tethering (not having omnipresence). In essence the network topology becomes part of the security ... none of this really is enforced by the protocol itself.
For example, I could create a version of the client that is compatible with the protocol, but that has automatic peer discovery (perhaps of other people running my modified client), with another tip selection algorithm. My version will be much more user friendly -- no mutual tethering required ...

Quote from: Aviv_Zohar(SPECTRE) link=https://medium.com/@johndom/iota-and-spectre-64ee12d9b1a8
IOTA gives a protocol, but it doesn’t do so very formally so it is very hard to analyze. .. So we had concerns about, I guess, the white paper, but it could be just that we are misreading what the protocol does because it is not stated formally enough for us.

Quote from: Apenzl link=https://www.nxter.org/ardor-vs-competition-pt-3-iota/
PoW successfully secures blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum because it isn’t tied to the transaction rate[/b], or any other factor besides the economic value of the network. ...
With IOTA, in contrast, there is no economic incentive to secure the network. Moreover, the hashpower securing the network is tied directly to the transaction rate, which naturally has some upper limit dependent on bandwidth and network topology.

Quote from: Vitalik Buterin link=https://www.reddit.com/r/CryptoCurrency/comments/72l7kp/why_i_find_iota_deeply_alarming_eth_core_dev/dnk2zdy/
I strongly disagree with many of IOTA's technical decisions (trinary, custom hash functions, POW on transactions), and find some of their behavior deeply egregious to the point where it goes beyond mere negligence. The "security flaw as copy protection" thing is particularly offensive, and makes it difficult to trust the current dev team.

Quote from: killerstorm link=https://www.reddit.com/r/CryptoCurrency/comments/72l7kp/why_i_find_iota_deeply_alarming_eth_core_dev/dnlo145/
OK, what are advantages of Tangle?
Tangle requires to download all transactions to validate it, as PoW is contained within transactions themselves.
On the other hand, in blockchain you only need block headers to validate PoW.
So, for example, to validate the latest Bitcoin block you need to download 39 MB of data.

Quote from: segfaultsteve link=https://www.reddit.com/r/Iota/comments/7572kx/help_me_understand_how_double_spends_are_prevented/do471sc/
The newest version of the white paper added a paragraph that partially addresses .. concern about the split tangle:
Quote
As an additional protecting measure, we can first ran a random walk with a large α (so that it is in fact “almost deterministic”) to choose a “model tip”; then, use random walks with small α for actual tip selection, but verify if the (indirectly) referenced transactions are consistent with the model tip.
The argument is that this modified algorithm would very quickly select one of the two subtangles to "win," and the other would quickly get orphaned, minimizing the number of transactions that need to be resubmitted (i.e., because they chose the losing subtangle).
Personally, though, I'm a bit skeptical of this solution. While I think it would make a double-spend more difficult (see also section 4.2 of the white paper), I think it could unfortunately make it easier to execute a denial-of-service attack that continuously splits the tangle to prevent most transactions from ever being confirmed with high probability:
https://www.reddit.com/r/Iota/comments/73zyzj/how_does_iota_protect_against_a_dos_attack_that/

Quote from: Vitalik_Buterin‏ link=https://twitter.com/VitalikButerin/status/916817338820812801
I still haven't heard an argument for why tangle doesn't require every node to download and verify every transaction to be secure.

Quote from: baobabkoodaa_slack
Since IOTA doesn't have an incentive mechanism for attracting honest hash power, what reason is there to think it will ever have much?
So how is IOTA supposed to achieve enough honest hash power to fend off double spending attacks?

Quote
Today, you have to find peers by soliciting strangers' IP addresses from a slack channel. Besides being inconvenient, this is insecure because a malicious person can create multiple accounts, and host multiple full nodes. IoTA has none of the protections against a sybil attack that is built into bitcoin core's addrman class.

Quote from: 8eHfCKNV‏ link=https://boards.4chan.org/biz/thread/4759650
IOTA is fundamentally broken.
It's a PoW crypto that uses a dag (ok). Hype aside it's a minor change that's equivalent to transaction chains in Lightning Network or Raiden, offering exactly the same advantages (asynchronous) and disadvantages (lower security). Where iota breaks down is assuming a model with everyone mining their own transactions can work.

What PoW means in practice is that cost spent on mining = security. Ie. $100 fees per hour? Spend >$100 (in energy used for mining) to rewind these transactions. It's better with asics as that adds 'has access to asics'.

The reason PoW currencies currently work is because cost is shared among every owner due to inflation - with it, total cost per tx in bitcoin is $81.91. Iota is economically exactly like Bitcoin without any block reward, which requires every transaction to pay a very high fee (in energy used for mining) for any reasonable security.
Firstly, it requires every iota sender to be _able_ to do that - which means high-speed hardware capable of mining and access to required energy. A premise fundamentally incompatible with light IoT devices.
Secondly, the fee market doesn't work due to the free rider problem. Everyone is going to use low fees (=low PoW expenditure) hoping that a high-fee transaction confirms it, or lots of other low-fee tranactions. Which means no high-fee transactions, which means no security at all.

That's why there's a coordinator. It's never going away. The fundamental design is hopelessly broken.

Quote from: Daniel_Rice_2017.12.14 link=https://medium.com/@thedrbits/why-i-also-find-iota-deeply-alarming-99d4f2da3282
... First of all, practically zero IOT devices will have the resources to act as a full node on a public cryptocurrency network. Even without storage requirements, how do you feel to know that your fridge is using 99% of your internet bandwidth because it is acting as a node on the IOTA network listening and relaying transactions? ...

+++++++++
Coordicide - вопросы

Quote from: Sarah_Jamie_Lewis_2019.06.06 link= https://twitter.com/SarahJamieLewis/status/1136727928203501568
They have solved the problem relating to peers not always having a global view of the network by assigning them a value which is derived from a function requiring a global view of the network ...
You can't solve "nodes can conceal transactions from other nodes" through transaction-based reputation
legendary
Activity: 1540
Merit: 1096
Chat-for-Ban продолжает банить людей в слэке ни за что, просто по принципу "Ты виноват уж тем, что хочется мне кушать" - причём уже в канале #tanglemath

Кому важно, судите сами:  

идёт долгий разговор о mesh-сетях, об их изолированности, о разделяющих их горах и океанах, и наконец Chat-for-Ban ловит Sunny Aggarwal на слове и требует подтверждения:
Quote
Chat-for-Ban [11:53 PM] "any transactions that happen within that 1000-node cluster are “safe”.  But anything coming in from outside that cluster (through the 10 gateway nodes) are susceptible to the supercomputer"
Is the above correct?
Micah и Sunny послушно отвечают:
Quote
Micah Zoltu [11:54 PM]  Yes.
Sunny Aggarwal [11:54 PM]  Yes.
и тут внезапно Chat-for-Ban переходит от изолированных (по определению) mesh-сетей к глобальной:
Quote
Chat-for-Ban [11:54 PM]  Now tell me how can you attack when our cluster covers 90% of the earth.
Micah в шоке, как можно так резко перечеркнуть долгое обсуждение морей и океанов:
Quote
Micah Zoltu [11:54 PM]  How did you jump to that?
Chat-for-Ban [11:54 PM] it's just an assumption
Chat-for-Ban [11:56 PM]  So, to make it clear:
Your attack works if our cluster can't cover 90% of the earth.
Your attack does NOT work if our cluster can cover 90% of the reath.
Agree?
Micah Zoltu [11:56 PM]  I am not currently thinking about an attack against a global and backbone free mesh network.  For the sake of this discussion, I propose we ignore it.
If you believe a 90% backbone free mesh network is a realistic dependency of Iota, then we should discuss that instead.
Chat-for-Ban давит:
Quote
Chat-for-Ban [11:57 PM]  I need your to say only AGREE or DISAGREE to
"Your attack works if our cluster can't cover 90% of the earth.
Your attack does NOT work if our cluster can cover 90% of the reath.""
Agree?
Micah Zoltu [11:58 PM]  I cannot assert whether the attack works against a 90% global backbone free mesh network because I haven't thought about it.  I don't intend to think about it because I think that is an unrealistic requirement.
Chat-for-Ban наезжает:
Quote
Chat-for-Ban [11:59 PM]  @micah.zoltu Now it looks to me that you are trying to evade giving a direct answer to a direct question.
Micah Zoltu [11:59 PM]  I gave you a direct answer. If you do think that 90% global coverage backbone free global mesh network is possible then we should discuss that.
Micah Zoltu [12:02 AM]  Perhaps it will help if I modify my original argument:
1. Given that a global mesh network is not possible with today's technology.
2. A motivated actor in the Iota system can simulate as many nodes as it wants.
If you disagree with (1) then we should discuss that.
Sunny и Micah вспоминают, как называется эта Chat-for-Ban-ова уловка в диспуте: "Софизм существования", когда требуют согласиться с двусмысленным выражением, например, "Каждый единорог имеет ровно один рог".
Quote
Micah Zoltu [12:06 AM]  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existential_fallacy
Chat-for-Ban [12:39 AM]  @micah.zoltu @sunnya97 I'm back to our unicorn.
Chat-for-Ban [12:43 AM]  So... To make sure: If I pull out of my sleeve such network you both lose the dispute, right?
Micah Zoltu [12:46 AM]  *sigh* we have answered you several times.
Chat-for-Ban [12:46 AM]  Just Agree or Disagree
Micah Zoltu [12:46 AM]  I'm not sure what you want from us.  I'm not going to blindly agree to something I have spent zero time considering.
Chat-for-Ban [12:46 AM]  I can give you more time, but this will be continued tomorrow only
Micah вежливо объясняет суть "Софизма существования":
Quote
Micah Zoltu [12:46 AM]  I have no intention of spending my time thinking about how Iota will function in the face of Unicorns. Either you can argue that Unicorns are real and if successful I will consider it, or we can just end the conversation, or we can discuss Iota in a world without unicorns.
Chat-for-Ban наезжает конкретно:
Quote
Chat-for-Ban [12:47 AM]  @micah.zoltu I really starting thinking that we'll never be able to argue ever again. It's because you evade direct questions that may lead to your loss in a dispute
Micah Zoltu [12:51 AM]  @come-from-beyond You are making the following logical fallacy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existential_fallacy
Chat-for-Ban [12:51 AM]  @micah.zoltu I don't want to put too much pressure on you but you should decide...
Micah Zoltu [12:52 AM]  If continuing this discussion requires me to lie to have it continue, then I'm not interested in continuing.
Chat-for-Ban [12:52 AM]  @micah.zoltu pity, but nothing can be done then
Chat-for-Ban [12:56 AM]  @micah.zoltu sorry, I'm not going to argue with you anymore
вскоре после этого Chat-for-Ban идёт спать, а на следующий день, без всяких разговоров
Quote
Chat-for-Ban [8:10 PM]  @micah.zoltu you were caught on evading accepting losing in a dispute. At this point I treat you as a troll. Anything you want to tell as the last word before I ban you?


и это при том, что с главным тезисом Micah-а "The whitepaper describes a particular parent selection strategy and then defends a number of attacks based on that assumption." о неполноценности Ёто-whitepaper соглашается даже автор Ёто-whitrpaper, Serguei Popov:
Quote
Serguei Popov [2:48 AM]  Of course, it would be nice to have a proof that iota is secure. Believe me, I would really like to be able to obtain it. But I couldn't. Well, sometimes things get too complicated. So, all I have for now is my Markov chains' intuition, about which I humbly think it deserves some respect.



Поскольку горе-ёпто-менеджеры в качестве основного средства коммуникаций выбрали слэк, с его исчезающими сообщениями, для интересующихся алгоритмической стороной Ёты привожу полное обсуждение, и затем TL;DR одного из возможных векторов атаки:
Code:
Serguei Popov [2017.06.08 2:46 AM] The idea of MCRW tip selection strategy: it should be (a) sufficiently random (otherwise too many "unlucky" tips would be left behind), and (b) resistant to attacks one can imagine
Micah Zoltu [2:48 AM] In the whitepaper it says the walkers should start "deep in the tangle".  How is deep defined?
Serguei Popov [2:48 AM] Don't know. As deep as possible, depending on practical viability
Micah Zoltu [2:49 AM] I mean, how are you defining "deep"? Far from all tips via all paths? (edited)
Serguei Popov [2:49 AM] yes
Micah Zoltu [2:49 AM] It seems that if you can answer the "what is deep" problem you don't actually need to walk at all? Or do you walk randomly backwards from known tips, then walk randomly forward from wherever you land? Or perhaps it just means "old" (e.g., transactions you saw come through a long time ago).
Serguei Popov [2:50 AM] well, you can just choose among all tx's that appeared between (say) 1 hour and 30 min ago
Micah Zoltu [2:50 AM] OK.  So you choose _old_ (but not necessarily deep) transactions.
Serguei Popov [2:51 AM] these are _likely_ to be also deep
Micah Zoltu [2:52 AM] Sure, though I think the paper should be updated to say "old" rather than "deep" because "deep" implies that the selection algorithm is based on depth, not on age. In reality, you select on age and then compute depth (sort of).
Serguei Popov [2:53 AM] well, I don't really know what is the "best" selection algorithm. we can probably think of many _reasonable_ ones
Micah Zoltu [2:53 AM] OK, so you choose `n` random old transactions then you walk forward from each of them randomly choosing a child at each step until you reach a tip.  Once you have done this for all `n` (or they have timed out) you then choose the lowest distancet two tips?
So this tells me that as a selfish actor _not_ following this strategy, the optimal strategy is to build on other of my transactions that I want to promote.
That is, any of my old transactions that are within the selection time window that have stuff built on top of them.  The more they have built on top of them, the less likely they are to be selected for (since they will have a long walk to a tip).
Serguei Popov [2:58 AM] time to tip shouln't be important. exit probabilities matter
Micah Zoltu [2:58 AM] from the white paper: "the two random walks that reach the tip set first will indicate our two tips to approve"
My goal as a selfish miner is to increase the probability as much as possible that average distance-to-tip for any one of my transactions in the starting point eligibility window is as short as possible.
Serguei Popov [3:00 AM] "My goal as a selfish miner is ..." <- You need to control the exit probabilities too.
Micah Zoltu [3:01 AM] If I understand your goal correctly, you are trying to achieve an parent selection strategy such that the optimal strategy in face of others following the same strategy is to similarly follow that strategy.
Serguei Popov [3:01 AM] the same or at least similar; to know which tips are likely to be selected by the others, you'll have to do MCRW anyway
!! Micah Zoltu [3:03 AM] I'm operating under the assumption that the cost of selection is marginal compared to other costs and it is relatively trivial for a selfish miner to pick the mathematically best parents to maximize their chances of being selected for in the future, without having to run any randomized simulations.
Serguei Popov [3:05 AM] "I'm operating under the assumption .." <- I'm not sure it's a reasonable assumption. How exactly the selfish miner would do that?
Micah Zoltu [3:05 AM] A selfish miner can track all live tips as well as track all of the transactions that are in the common selection window and the distance from each of those to all of their tips.
Serguei Popov [3:06 AM] I have to go, sorry.
...
Micah Zoltu [4:00 AM] I would _like_ to be convinced that following MCMC _is_ the optimal strategy for a selfish miner when all other miners are behaving the same way, but I don't see that as being the case at the moment.
So there is the question of whether the majority of IoT devices will include ASICs and burn electricity doing proof of work.  For that discussion I believe that in the long run that won't happen because that strategy is marginally more expensive than the alternative "do nothing" strategy and I don't see a campaign for social welfare of Iota winning out over a campaign for lower energy consumption/costs.
But its possible that with the right connections you can influence _enough_ big players and drive marginal costs down low enough that most people don't care.
Paul H [4:03 AM] I don't think that PoW locality is relevant to tip selection
Micah Zoltu [4:03 AM] Right, that was the first half of my discussion with Serguei.
The second half was tip selection strategy for a selfish miner.
Where in this case a selfish miner's goal is to make his tip _most-likely_ to be selected by others while also (if possible) not selecting anyone else's tips.
That is, the selfish actor wants others to select his tip while never selecting anyone else's tips.
The reason for not wanting to select anyone else's tips is because he recognizes that as someone with substantial hashing power, if he and other heavy-hashers follow the "don't help the network" strategy then they can change the market dynamics so that they can run their miners at a profit.  If others _don't_ join him in his strategy then at worst he simply is as well off (if not better) than using the default strategy. (edited)
So, the question is, is there a tip selection strategy that a miner can take such that he will bias tip selection of the common strategy actors towards his tips without having to include anyone else's tips in his selection.
Such a strategy would create a trustless conglomerate that could alter the market dynamics such that they can start charging inclusion fees.
e.g., someone could release such a client to high-hash-power individuals that would yield same rewards if no one else uses it, and _better_ rewards if others _do_ use it.
Paul H [4:09 AM] I'm probably about to lose wifi again, sorry (back on the road)
Micah Zoltu [4:09 AM] Finally, there is a third point of argument that I haven't really brought up yet which is total network hashing power will likely be _very_ low if there is no incentive to hash more than is minimally necessary to get included, since extra hashing costs money and without transaction fees there is no return on that investment.
projectShift (Ricardo) [4:10 AM] but why would that be a problem?
Micah Zoltu [4:10 AM] Looking at the selection strategy in the whitepaper, it doesn't appear that there is compelling reason to hash heavily since tip selection is random-ish.  The gains of hashing are marginal relative to the energy costs.
Well, it becomes a problem because it lowers the cost of a sybil attack.
e.g., if total hash power is small enough, a single entity could spin up a giant sub-tangle with enough hash power behind it and enough transactions in it that it dwarfs the main tangle.  That actor could double-spend (traditional double-spend with lots of power attack).
The entire point of doing PoW anything is to drive that price up.  But that only works if people are sufficiently incentivized to give away non-trivial amounts of hashing power.
e.g., if every transaction has 1 unit of hash power behind it and I can generate 1 gigaunits of hashing power per second, I can sipn up a complete isolated side-tangle, double spend, then merge it right at the optimal time (middle of the MCMW tip selection window).
projectShift (Ricardo) [4:11 AM] ah! (sybil) the ever present issue
Paul H [4:15 AM] This assumes that you have enough hash power to overcome the present hash rate of the network.
projectShift (Ricardo) [4:15 AM] his point was just that, the network would have low hash power because there is no incentive (edited)
Micah Zoltu [4:16 AM] Also, in the MCMW algorithm in the white paper it didn't see anywhere where weight actually came into the tip selection process significantly.
There was the weight range thing, but it seems incredibly gamable to ensure that you fall within that range. (just requires distributing your hashing power across an optimal amount of tangle, which the random selection people will not be doing). (edited)
projectShift (Ricardo) [4:17 AM] ^we played around with that in testnet, didn't really play as a factor of importance
Micah Zoltu [4:17 AM] Which?  The weight range thing?
projectShift (Ricardo) [4:18 AM] yeah, the range; we tried various intervals with spamming, it didn't amount to what was expected
projectShift (Ricardo) [4:18 AM] but that was 4 versions ago, ofc, may not stand like that anymore
Micah Zoltu [4:18 AM] So without weight playing in at all, hashing power is effectively meaningless and the strategy boils down to setting up the optimal sub-tangle such that it is incredibly likely to be chosen in a conflict.
Which means you _must_ have weight be a significant part of (tip) parent selection, but then it means someone with high hash power can bias selection towards their tangle because they are focusing their hashing power while everyone else is distributing it.
Paul H [4:21 AM] Currently, the own weight is not considered in the tip selection (all tx are counted as 1), but a tx rating for tip selection is the sum of its own weight and the cumulative weights of its approvers
Micah Zoltu [4:21 AM] ^ So at the moment, it sounds like (tip) parent selection is basically just "shortest path to tip" from random transaction within a given time window.
Paul H [4:24 AM] it's not shorest path, but weight-est path
tx with most tx packed on it is the one that becomes most likely to be selected starting from a tx somewhere in the past ( currently milestones )
Micah Zoltu [4:24 AM] According to the whitepaper: "the two random walks that reach the tip set first will indicate our two tips to approve"
Reaching tip first is shortest path since all walkers walk in lockstep, right?
My interpretation of the strategy based on whitepaper and earlier discussions is:
So choose `n` random transactions between `x` seconds ago and `y` seconds ago.  Randomly walk towards tips from each of those in lockstep with eachother (they all step simultaneously) until two have reached a tip.  Those two are selected as parents.
I suspect my interpretation is wrong since it doesn't include weight (hash power) at all.
Its effectively a "without burning too much resources on optimization, try to find the least connected transactions and connect them to each other.  Over time this should lead to a general merging of all known sub-tangles. (edited)
AFK (for reals this time).
projectShift (Ricardo) [4:29 AM] ^that is an important factor, so we can have one big Tangle ... but only one.
Matthew Niemerg [4:33 AM] How I read the WP with the MCMC method, you take `n` random walkers placed on `n` random transactions. They walk towards the tips independently.  Choice in which direction to go is weighted more towards a transaction with higher cumulative weight if you are deeper in the tangle and then as you get closer to the tips, this spreads out to more of a random walk.  Then, in order to determine what your transactions' confirmation threshold is, you take number of random walkers that reach a tip that directly or indirectly reference the transaction of interest and divide that by `n` to give you percentage.
So I don't understand why walkers would be in lockstep.  They all reach a tip at some point (finite path length) and are independent.  You just need to know how many walkers reference the transaction of interest to get a probability that you are 'good'.
And as Paul mentions, all weights of each transaction are 1, but cumulative weight of a transaction isn't the sum of the path length.  Cumulative weight is the sum of all direct or indirect references of other transactions (only counted once), as per the definition.
Micah Zoltu [5:53 AM] What you just described doesn't sound like (tip) parent selection, it sounds like confirmation probability calculation.
It _feels_ like an altruistic (tip) parent selection algorithm would want to choose the heaviest weight tip and combine it with the tip with the highest unique weight.  The goal of this altruistic miner would be to attempt to get all transactions to converge to a single tip.
Of course, this strategy doesn't do anything to defend against an attacker generating a larger subtangle, double-spending on it and the current dominant tangle, then introducing their subtangle into the network and convincing everyone to build off of it instead.
Matthew Niemerg [6:12 AM] No. Tip selection is still a random walk. You have walkers that are moving towards the tips. Hence the walkers land on tips and that is selection. Oh you mean, tip selection as in, new transaction picks transactions to refer to.
Micah Zoltu [6:13 AM]
Right.  What I was describing above was "parent selection" selection, not confirmation calculation.
продолжение в следующем посте
full member
Activity: 311
Merit: 100
Простите меня пожалуйста! Мне так стыдно! Я таблетки пью от своего недуга, он проходит.

А так что там по моему вопросу с расчетом йот? 1 монета - 1 мегайота, 1024 монет - 1 гигайота?
1ce
full member
Activity: 211
Merit: 101
newbie
Activity: 51
Merit: 0
@cfb, а что там с джинном? Забили на него уже?

Засекречено. Нет.
и все же информация иногда просачивается https://habrahabr.ru/company/intel/blog/325366/  Smiley
насчет IOTA, у кого остался NXT ассет https://nxtforum.org/asset-exchange-general/(ann)-iota-asset/ можно обменять. Пару дней назад получили йоты через пару часов после транзакции.

Они бесхитростно скаманули всех. Причём более очевидного и прямолинейного скама придумать сложно.
Но адепты джинна и ёты отличаются невероятной, образцовой лояльностью. Удивительные люди.
Но в этом есть в том числе заслуга авторов - придумать такую дичь как как сбор бабла на создание тринарного процессора парой ноунеймов. Лучше этого наверное только сбор бабла на полёт на марс солнце, любые люди с зачатками интеллекта сразу бы отсеялись. Умно.
Что касается твоей ссылки - у новости дата 1-е апреля. Это намёк Smiley
Jump to: