Danke an Lakai01 und nullCoiner für eure Abstimmungen.
Ich hab jetzt gerade nochmal einen Blick auf die Gebühren bei ADA geworfen, die sind durchwegs wesentlich niedriger:
Cardano hat das massive Problem der Umverteilung bei PoS mit fortschreitender Zeit gut erkannt, Avalanche leider nicht, wie man immer wieder sehen kann.
Ich hoffe echt, dass Avalanche die Wichtigkeit dieser Priorität bald erkennt, anstatt irgendwelche Umfragen zu erstellen, deren Ausgang maximal den Status Quo erhält.
Ein Asiate hat dazu einen sehr guten Kommentar im Avalanche Forum geschrieben:
The mechanism of Proof-of-Stake, over time, leads to coin centralization (of the remaining un-minted capacity).
A holds 1 million
B holds 1000
Annual returns: 10%
The real starting line is here,
A makes, through staking, 100 000 (of newly minted coins) out of the remaining 345 million
B makes, through staking, 100 (of newly minted coins) out of the remaining 345 million
Both keep same percentage holdings relative to entire capacity of coins, but amount of the newly minted coins are in the hands of A. Therefore over a long time-frame, the actual coin gap widens between the large and small holders. (Note the point below is focused on the difference in amount of coins, and not percentage among the total available coins since that is constant if both stake to receive the same percentage return annually based on a same period of staking time.)
Thus, when one wants decentralization in a PoS ecosystem after Mainnet release over time(after initial mint and the start of staking), one has to ask what kind of decentralization?
While one can’t/shouldn’t hamper or damage larger holders with legit earnings through annual % returns. There could be a multi-layered design to lessen/prevent the above coin centralization from happening. Because over time, the new un-minted coins gravitate only in one direction, and that is towards the larger holdings. The end point, once the hard cap is reached, will leave the difference between the initial ICO spread with a much larger coin gap (this being dependent on an expectation that most stake their holdings until all coins are minted.)
It can then be deduced, that true decentralization can’t take place,(oligarchy occurs instead) because the out-sized holdings, now much bigger through PoS, have more accumulated power in voting rights (presumably governance is based on coin holdings) to decide the way forward. While the smaller holders, in time, will lose more and more of their voting power as they can’t catch up (mint their way ahead).
The reality will then induce a select group of wallets to hold the power of the ecosystem in any on-chain voting mechanism in the long term. The question then leads to where then is this supposed decentralization in the community?
We are lucky to be part of this community, the team had already set limits to the amount of stake a node can hold (think it tries to mitigate against some of the coin concentration in reality).
Node decentralization is the only possible decentralization. (Coin decentralization isn’t possible in a PoS system as described above, **if there are no ‘engineered’ limits/designs. But is there a meaning to node decentralization, if over time, the un-minted coins gravitate to the largest stakes anyways through whales having to just put up more nodes?)
IMO, if one were to design a more ‘egalitarian’ ecosystem over time, one could set fee limits and parameters based on node coin holdings.
If A holds 1 million coins and a parameter is set that the maximum delegation fee is 2% for this amount of coins, while below 1 million there is no maximum delegation fee, the rewards by the big holders would come from their coin minting process only(10% annual etc) rather than from fee taking too from the relatively smaller players in the ecosystem. Currently, whales do both obviously.
If this happened, B who holds 1000, can now have a slight advantage over the whales. By knowing the still un-minted coins in the PoS system is geared a little bit more in their favor, because there is no max fee limit for them that they can charge compared to A.
More and more nodes below 1 million would also arise, since having nodes above that amount would limit whale fee taking ability, naturally make them setup more nodes (could help with the path to 10 000 nodes if that is a goal.)
Of course Avalanche has already set a max cap(3.5 million I believe), my point is based on intentionally directed fee setting of a handicap in conjunction with the already max coin cap per node. The above A/B numbers is just used for simple numbering, still applies.
In conclusion, to induce decentralization (to a degree), fee parameter engineering should occur for PoS in a multi-layered approach, one friendly for the small hodlers who can ‘catch up’ in newly minted coin allocation, and one for the whales as a handicap. Whales also don’t need to worry too much since they could simply have to just push more nodes to be able to set their own fees above 2% by keeping their stack under 1 million per node each.
Though I am a capitalist, and believe in free market conditions, strong becoming stronger etc, I am still anti-oligarchy. Thought if these types of topics are thrown into the community to discuss, might as well think a bit more right? The fact that we can discuss the parameters now, already means ecosystem engineering is recognized as a must in PoS ecosystems.
I voted for 500 AVAX and 2%, but would go for 100 AVAX and min 1% fee and never change it again. And if the powers want to engineer the higher tiers, max 2% fee for maxed capped nodes/or over a certain threshold at whale level. Too complex? Maybe.
Another side note, these types of rewards/fees should be a set and forget IMO, regardless of current price. 100 AVAX and 1% min fee set and forget, may look extreme atm at $4, but if the community really wants to challenge ETH 2.0 and climb up the CMC, there must be an expectation of a high enough price happening. Market price would naturally align/reflect node operation profitability over time rather than having to manage the parameters along the way to fit what is affordable/cheap/entry friendly etc. at this moment in time.
https://forum.avax.network/t/avalanche-staking-delegation-proposal/216/113Darin geht er insbesondere auch auf die Governance ein, die möglicherweise ein weiteres Problem darstellt. Dabei hat Emin Gün Sirer mit "
Selfish Mining" ein passendes Papier beschrieben, dass wie die Faust aufs Auge passt. Man muss das nur auf Staking anpassen und schon hat man zumindest das Problem dargelegt.
Interessant ist besonders der markierte Teil, in dem er vorschlägt, die Delegation Fee abhängig von der Gesamtmenge der gestakten Coins zu machen. Je niedriger die Summe an Coins im jeweiligen Node, desto höher die Delegation Fee (bis 2% Fee), so sein Vorschlag.
Schneller als alles, was ich bisher dorthin geschickt hatte, das Deposit dauerte keine Minute...
Ein weiterer dicker PLUS Punkt ...
