There are other, less expensive ways to find moles.
This makes more sense:
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 24, 2023
Military experts from the Institute for the Study of War are vainly minding not their own business, trying to figure out the intricacies of Russian political cuisine. Prigozhin never even verbally criticized Putin, in Russia it is somehow not customary to bite the hand that feeds you. The mercenaries of the Wagner group either have a pro-Putin position, or are completely apolitical, more loyal to Putin than Wagner, only bodyguards from his personal guard. This is the only reason why Wagner could exist at all for so long, being outside the legal field (mercenarism in Russia is a criminal offense, Article 359 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation).This makes more sense:
Quote
Suggestions that Prigozhin’s rebellion, the Kremlin’s response, and Lukashenko’s mediation were all staged by the Kremlin are absurd. The imagery of Putin appearing on national television to call for the end of an armed rebellion and warning of a repeat of the 1917 revolution – and then requiring mediation from a foreign leader to resolve the rebellion – will have a lasting impact. The rebellion exposed the weakness of the Russian security forces and demonstrated Putin’s inability to use his forces in a timely manner to repel an internal threat and further eroded his monopoly on force. Prigozhin’s rapid drive towards Moscow ridiculed much of the Russian regular forces – and highlighted to any and all security figures, state-owned enterprises, and other key figures in the Russian government that private military forces separate from the central state can achieve impressive results. Wagner’s drive also showcased the degradation of Russia’s military reserves, which are almost entirely committed to fighting in Ukraine, as well as the dangers of reliance on inexperienced conscripts to defend Russia’s borders. The Kremlin struggled to respond quickly in the information space and residents in Rostov-on-Don residents did not oppose Wagner and in some cases greeted them warmly – not inherently demonstrating opposition to Putin but at minimum acceptance of Prigozhin’s actions.[48] Finally, the Kremlin’s apparent surprise at Prigozhin’s move does not reflect well on Russia’s domestic intelligence service, the FSB. Prigozhin consistently escalated his rhetoric against the Russian MoD prior to his armed rebellion and Putin failed to mitigate this risk.[49] We cannot and will not speculate on the concrete impacts of Prigozhin’s rebellion and the Kremlin’s weak response and are not forecasting an imminent collapse of the Russian government, as some have done. Nonetheless, Prigozhin’s rebellion and the resolution of the events of June 23 and 24 - though not necessarily the Prigozhin/Kremlin struggle writ large - will likely substantially damage Putin’s government and the Russian war effort in Ukraine.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 24, 2023
ps By Wagner, I mean the main core of the Wagner group, not including the former prisoners who temporarily joined it, recruited on six-month contracts specifically for the assault on Bakhmut.
