Topic: [XMR] Monero - A secure, private, untraceable cryptocurrency - page 1479. (Read 4670972 times)

The usually count +/-, nothing unusual

Forks cause exchanges to freeze up. That would be too risky.

Or it wasn't (directly) economically motivated to attack an exchange, perhaps to simply attack the coin directly (especially if they underestimated us and didn't think we could fix it).

But we are still just guessing.

How many blocks have your servers found since the attack, relative to an average of what they normally find?

rpitilla did say something about what he described as unusual trading that day. i don't know the details.

With price-discovery in the markets, the definition of "artificial" is vague. In one sense, the decline from 510 to 400 and below was "artificial" (if we assume it was, at least partly, a product of preknowledge of the coming attack and speculation that it would further hurt the price). In the other sense, the essence of markets is that all knowledge is taken into account, information is not perfect, and seldom even the best informed players have access to many information that some of the others have, in turn.

If we discount the last week downturn altogether, the price should be much higher by now. The attack failed - it could not damage the confidence towards XMR, it exposed the old scammers more, and proved how capable the devteam is. "Rolling back" the preparation of the attack from price history would lift us to 600 by tomorrow.

But if the market collectively decides that a selloff is in order, we might find ourselves at 300 instead. That some buyers openly like XMR at 400, is no more artificial than others vowing in the trollbox that they will sell every one of theirs, at whatever price they can get once the trading starts. Depending who will prevail, buying at 400 may be the last opportunity to buy at 400, or the last opportunity to sell at 400. Most likely, given the meager actual effect of the attack, it won't be neither, and anyone making decisions based on what others have already done, is just impoverishing himself as a result.

I have a largish number of XMR and BTC in the exchange, ready to react. But my reaction will be to buy if the price goes down, and sell if it goes up. This is my way of making slow and steady profit. Others have their way, and without panickers, my income would be significantly lower.

I agree. What about using foreknowledge of this to trade (assuming people will panic).

I agree. What about using foreknowledge of this to trade (assuming people will panic).

There just has to be a financial motive for this. only thing makes sense

There have been other currencies that have been launched with no premine, no instamine, no IPO, with development entirely funded by donations. And that didn't have a crippled hash function at launch.

Monero has had a relatively fair launch. But to make a claim as grand as you just did is quite strong. There are many other positive aspects of Monero that are based in fact and can be proudly trumped instead. One of which is the solid dev team that takes an honest approach to communication and doesn't sugar coat the issues. This is rare and exceptional in my opinion.

edit: attempt and succeed btw.

then this makes no rational sense....
They clearly really understand the codebase
This indicates they wrote it or they have studied it extensively, I cant see anyone just randomly finding this and making elaborate attack.

Is there some "cascade" issue that having this fork could trigger?
Like dominos, the fork is the first and that makes an opening for another edge case?

It just seems like 100x more effort for just making a temporary fork. Any chance that a many blocks could have been mined consecutively without actually mining due to this fork, directly or indirectly.

There just has to be a financial motive for this. only thing makes sense

James

Nope - bear in mind that basically without any action from us the "bad" fork died after 35 minutes. It still exists, it's just stuck at block 202647 and won't proceed. This would have happened even if we hadn't noticed it, so there's little they could have done to have any long-lived attack.

So, I have also researched this fork from pool side.

I think the attacker doesn't need so much power because they used power from existing pools.

I have found that 202614 on both forks were found by my servers:

Erebor1: (height,difficulty,bhash,timesec)

Moria:

And time difference is ca. 15 minutes, so therefore forks happens before. After that Erebor1 was on wrong chain some time.

But how he has organized bad TX's I don't known. And who found blocks 202612?

The scope of this attack clearly makes it an organized effort. While it is possible that some lone guy is figuring out the flaw and how to take advantage of it, the fact we are needing more than one skillset and resources more indicates a team is involved.

Theoretically if you guys didnt notice the strange stuff on the blockchain and polo went on a fork, could they have just made many small withdraws over a week and drained the polo acct? The timeframe and resources required for this doesnt seem like some statment attack to cause a fork and go "ha ha", but where financial gain is involved.

If so, the list if suspects as being involved in this would be polo accts that were involved in accumulating recently (which I remember seeing talked about) and probably these were also trying to do the double spend while on the fork.

So, maybe the attack was against polo?

James

Correct.

edit: Though I will note that these tx had non-standard fees of 0.000000000001, which no mining node on the network would have included using any version of the reference code, so the attacker did for some reason mine the second block on both forks (to what end I'm not sure, maybe just to impress us).

I cannot create an account.
The website is stuck at:
https://poloniex.com/signup_validate.php

Am I under personal attack or something?

And who found blocks 202612?

Further we will be restructuring, refactoring, and/or replacing some of the code in order to further increase its robustness and trustworthiness (removing obfuscation for example).