Hi guys,
I'm trying to find a reliable bitcoin mixer, and my concern is the following. If the software of the mixing website is run at a hosting/vps-provider-owned server, not at a home/on-premises server owned by the mixer admins, then the hosting or vps provider has full access to the logs. In other words, we have to trust both mixer admins and the hosing provider that they don't send the pairs "input mixing transaction - output mixing transaction" to the governments. The same concern raises if the webiste is run at an on-premises server, but there is a vps/vpn/hosting provider who MITMs the traffic (officially this is usually called "ddos-protection").
I checked the websites in the straing post, and I see the following.
1. Most of the mixers show the standard cloudfare's anti-TOR page ("checking if the connection is secure...") when I open their clearnet versions through TOR. This is a 100% sign that cloudfare MITMs the traffic or runs the whole website software. And these mixers allow mixing through clearnet, effectively giving away the users' data to cloudfare. These are:
https://coinomize.biz/,
https://mixer1.money/,
https://mixtum.io/,
https://mixy.money/,
https://sinbad.io/en,
https://mixero.io/2. At three more mixers, I didn't see the cloudfare's anti-TOR page, but when I DNS-resolved their IP addresses and navigated to this bare IP address, I saw one more standard coludfare's page "Direct IP access not allowed". So, cloudfare is still involved. Theoretically, this does not imply MITM so directly as in the previous case, but I'm not sure whether coludfare provides any service at all that redirects TLS traffic after SNI to an on-premises server, I think they are a pure hosing provider (if they redirected TCP/IP traffic to an on-premises server, we wouldn't see cloudfare's pages when accessing the bare IP, and I don't think they offer TCP/IP redirection either). If they indeed don't offer TLS traffic redirection after SNI (does anyone know this for sure here?), then cloudfare still has access to all data of the users of these mixers. (And yes, these mixers still accept bitcoins via clearnet.) These include:
https://mixer.blindmixer.com/,
https://mixtura.money/,
https://unijoin.io/3a. One more mixer, after a similar check (resolve DNS, navigate to the bare IP), shows some not so common page saying "DDOS-guard". Again, I'm not sure and I want to ask the people here: is there any "anti-ddos" software available that is intended for installation at an on-premise server? Or is such a page at a bare IP address again a sign that the website is run at a hosting provider's server? This mixer is
https://cryptomixer.io/, IP address: 185.178.208.139, still allows mixing through clearnet.
3b. One more mixer behaves very similarly, except that instead of a page saying "DDOS-guard", it replies to a bare IP request with a page saying "bad gateway", which has a self-signed SSL sertificate issued by "ddos-guard". This is:
https://yomix.io/, IP address: 185.149.120.23
4. There is 1 mixers in the list left that look a bit better than that:
https://anonymixer.com/ (IP: 185.193.125.108, with a bare IP access: no response on port 80, port 443 replies with an SSL-certificate of anonymixer.com), so no direct signs of a provider-owned server (or maybe I just don't see one?)
By the way, who do some of the TOR links in the start post point to v2 TOR addresses? They are not supported by the TOR network anymore, unfortunately. Even if you prevented you local tor package from updating, the middle tor noe operators typically didn't do so, so v2 TOR addresses are more or less unreachable now.